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ABSTRACT
The central idea of “democratic peace” theory (DP) is that democracies do not 
go to war with another. Since the 1960s this theory has been extremely popular 
among political scientists, but there are a number of methodological problems 
attached to the exploration of DP theory. Quantitative tests with few variables 
raise the question of validity. How to distinguish between war and peace, and 
how to define democracy are but a few of the problems “democratic peace” 
theorists must encounter. This study discusses several different concepts of de-
mocracy, showing that there has been a huge variety of more or less democratic 
systems through history; a point which is often lost when using cases spanning 
over a highly diversified universe in terms of space and time. 
Another problematic aspect of the theory is that of democratisation as 
such. Democratisation has proven to be a potentially dangerous transformation 
process with the capacity of breeding lethal nationalism and intolerance. In spite 
of all these problems, there are regions in the world where democracies have 
been peaceful neighbours for decades. However, the idea of “democratic peace” 
does not satisfactorily explain these phenomena, and there is a need for further 
historical research into this field.
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THE DEmOCRATIC PEACE CONTROVERSy
THE PROBlEm
The central idea of the “democratic peace” theory (DP) can be summed up in 
one sentence: Democracies do not go to war with one another, they have cre-
ated a kind of separate peace.2 This theory is extremely popular among some 
American political scientists and was taken over by several German and Scan-
dinavian scholars during the 1990s. Two American Presidents, such different 
personalities as Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, have declared in public that 
they strongly favour the theory. Clinton called the expansion of democracy the 
“third pillar” of his foreign policy, and one can even talk about a Clinton doc-
trine. The President was convinced that democracies will not fight wars against 
each other, that they will trade freely, and that they will respect their citizen’s 
human rights. On 5th February 1992, after the breakdown of the Soviet empire, 
James Baker, the American foreign secretary, perceived an opportunity to forge 
a democratic peace.3 In 1994, Anthony Lake, the American national security 
adviser proclaimed that the spread of democracy serves American interests, be-
cause democracies “tend not to … wage war on one another”. Also in 1994 the 
leaders of the G7 states discussed the proposal that the promotion of democra-
tisation be made a central part of their security policy.4 The administration of 
George W. Bush turned Clinton’s doctrine of peace and security into a crusade 
for democracy.5 During the 1990s one central maxim of American foreign policy 
was to promote global democratisation to secure peace. 
Several American authors still treat the democratic peace theory not as a 
hypothesis, but as a law, because, they claim the empirical regularities cannot 
be ignored. Jack S. Levy formulated the often quoted sentence: “[…] in general, 
wars involving all or nearly all of the great powers, democratic states have never 
fought on opposite sides. This absence of war between democracies comes as 
1 Thanks to Rolf Hobson for friendly support and many constructive debates.
2 Nils Peter Gleditsch, “Democracy and Peace”, Journal of Peace Research, no. 29 
(1992): 369.
3 John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace”, International Security, 
no. 19 (1994): 87 and 97; Charles W. Kegley and Margaret G. Hermann, “Military 
Intervention and the Democratic Peace”, International Interactions, no. 21 (1995): 1; 
Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence. Democratization and nationalist conflict (New 
York: Norton, 2000), p. 17.
4 Kegley and Hermann, “Military Intervention and the Democratic Peace”: 79.
5 Thomas Schwartz and Kiron K. Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace”, Orbis, 
no. 46 (2002): 159.
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close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.”6 How-
ever, paradoxically the 1990s were not only a period of democratisation, but 
also of chronic nationalist conflicts.7
Some of the arguments, which later were to become the democratic peace 
theory, were developed as early as the 1960s, when only a few democracies 
existed in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. In 1964, in a short 
article Dean V. Babst analysed 116 major wars and could not identify a single 
case of a war between two democracies. In his view the inherently peaceful 
public opinion in democracies plays the decisive role in preventing conflict, if 
the countries’ borders are stable and secure.8 With the exception of Rudolf J. 
Rummel and the COW project (Correlates of War) at the University of Michi-
gan, very few authors showed any interest in the theory until the end of the 
1980s, when a great number of publications followed.9 Although this sudden 
popularity has not yet been analysed in a systematic way, the connection with 
the end of the cold war seems to be obvious. Since the end of the 1980s a new 
wave of democratisation also took place in countries which previously had few 
or no democratic or liberal traditions. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave rise 
in the West to the aspiration that all of the conflicts which had threatened the 
existence of mankind could be resolved and a new page in the book of history 
be opened. Democratisation of the former dictatorships and the liberalisation of 
strongly regulated economies seemed to provide adequate answers to the prob-
lems which had arisen at the end of the cold war. This naïve mood is reflected 
in Francis Fukuyamas book about the End of History which has often been 
criticised for its allegedly facile reductionism.10 
6 Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War”, in The Origin and Prevention of Major 
Wars, eds Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 88; for example quoted in: Sven Chojnacki, „Demokratien 
und Krieg. Das Konfliktverhalten demokratischer Staaten im internationalen System, 
1946–2001“ [Democracies and War. The Conflict Behaviour of Democratic States 
in the International System] in Demokratien im Krieg [Democracies at War], ed. 
Christine Schweitzer (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2004), p. 74; Owen, “How 
Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace“: 87; James Lee Ray, “Does Democracy 
cause Peace?”, in Annual Review of Political Science, 1998, p. 31; Jost Dülffer, 
“Internationale Geschichte und Historische Friedensforschung” [International History 
and Historical Peace Research], in Internationale Geschichte. Themen – Ergebnisse 
– Aussichten [International History: Themes, Conclusions, Prospects], eds Wilfried 
Loth and Jürgen Osterhammel (München: Oldenbourg, 2000), p. 253; with a very 
positive comment: Gustaaf Geeraerts and Patrick Stouthuysen, eds, “Democracy 
and the future European Peace”, in Democratic Peace. Myth or Reality for Europe, 
Gustaaf Geeraerts and Patrick Stouthuysen (Brussels: VUB University Press, 1999), p. 
11.
7 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, p. 15.
8 Dean V. Babst, “Elective Governments – a Force for Peace”, Wisconsin Sociologist, no. 
3 (1964): 9–14.
9 Rudolf J. Rummel, Understanding conflict and War, 5 vol. (New York: Halsted Press, 
1976–1981).
10 See Francis Fukuyama, End of History and the last Man (New York: Maxwell 
Macmillan International, 1992).
The theorists of DP in its earliest form were convinced that democracies 
were generally more peaceful than authoritarian states or dictatorships. How-
ever, several other authors have refused this hypothesis. Chan, for example, has 
tested the argument that “the more libertarian a state, the less its foreign vio-
lence”. According to him, between 1816 and 1980, democracies have fought 
as many wars as non-democracies with the democratic states of Israel, India, 
France and Great Britain heading his ranking list. Relatively free societies also 
participated in extra-systemic wars to a very high degree.11 Gleditsch and Hegre 
found additional empirical evidence that democracies were as much involved 
in wars as any other type of society, whereas other authors were unable to find 
any difference between democratic and non-democratic states with regard to the 
initiation of wars.12 Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that also in the case 
of non-democratic regimes and dictatorships, peace is the regular condition and 
war the exception independent of the degree of internal oppression or terror. 
Until recently the so-called “polity” sets, initiated by Tedd Gurr, have pro-
vided some of the most important data for democratic peace theorists. The Cor-
relates of War project, another collection of data, starts in1816, but critical 
historians have pointed out that the concentration on the 19th and 20th centuries 
produces results that are too narrow to underpin a universal theory of war and 
peace. Comparable statistical material for contemporary developments can be 
found in the yearbooks of the Freedom House project. Only Spencer Weart has 
used the democratic peace model for the analysis of city republics in the renais-
sance and early modern Europe. In his view the numbers of conflicts fell drasti-
cally when early modern city republics developed republican constitutions.13 
The vast majority of American political scientists, who are adherents of 
the democratic peace theory, use quantitative methods to a very high degree. 
Beneath both the COW and the polity sets, data from the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly are used to test whether common democratic ideals are contribut-
ing to the democratic peace. Small and Singer have argued that not war itself, 
but the responsibility for its outbreak should be analysed to find out how war-
like a system was.14 However, from a historical point of view this methodology 
gives rise to other problems which can hardly be resolved by statistical methods 
alone. Small and Singer, for instance, place responsibility for the outbreak of the 
Prussian-French war of 1870 squarely on the French side.15 This is partly true 
11 Steve Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall … Are the freer countries more pacific?” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 28 (1984): 620, 626ff and 638.
12 Niels Peter Gleditsch and Håvard Hegre, “Peace and Democracy. Three levels of 
analysis”, Journal of conflict resolution, no. 41 (1997): 284; Gleditsch, “Democracy 
and Peace”: 373.
13 Spencer Weart, Never at War. Why Democracies will not fight one another (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).
14 Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes”, 
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, no. 1 (1976): 53.
15 Ibid.: 57.
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because France did declare war on Prussia, but it is impossible to understand 
the complicated mechanism of escalation which led up to the declaration of the 
war without also analysing Bismarck’s intricate diplomatic game and the so 
called “Ems telegramme”. In the border conflict of 1962, China attacked first, 
but India had annexed the territory in question previously and had refused to 
start diplomatic negotiations. Also during the American Vietnam War it is not 
clear who was responsible for the escalation and the beginning of the fight-
ing. The COW project codes this war as a civil war although both North and 
South Vietnam were members of the international states system.16 In 1899 the 
Transvaal declared war on Great Britain and Boer troops attacked South Africa, 
but for several years prior to this the Cape Colony and Britain had used every 
opportunity to destabilize and provoke the Boer republics, to the point that a 
military conflict seemed to be inevitable. It is doubtful whether it will ever be 
possible to analyse such a highly dynamic escalation process adequately in sta-
tistical terms.
Some scholars have problems with other aspects of the democratic peace 
argument. It makes little sense, for the purpose of classification, to distinguish 
only between war and peace, because qualitative aspects should also be taken 
into consideration. Brazil and the Soviet Union were both belligerents in the Sec-
ond World War, but their participation was of a very different quality.17 Randall 
L. Schweller’s complicated diagrams analyzing the structure of Franco-German 
conflict in the 19th and 20th century might have benefited, had he been able to 
quote a single book or article in German or French. He is not even interested in 
reading the very good English historical literature on the topic.18 Such a com-
plete lack of historical knowledge combined with a highly developed sympathy 
for pure statistical models lead to results which a Frenchman no doubt would 
receive with a short “vraiement?”, whereas most German historians would find 
Schweller’s conclusions “außerordentlich erstaunlich” (extraordinarily aston-
ishing). 
The normal way to analyse the conflict structure in the international sys-
tem by means of statistics is dyadic, i.e. certain periods are analysed with regard 
to types and numbers of conflicts between states. This methodology has also 
been strongly criticised. It leads to strange results if every year of peace between 
Great Britain and the USA is to be evaluated as a statistical victory for the demo-
cratic peace theory. In an average year probably 99 per cent of the states in the 
world have peaceful relations with each other.19 Dülffer formulates two different 
critical aspects: Firstly, only in a very few cases does the dyadic concept fit the 
16 Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall”: 638.
17 Ibid.: 622.
18 Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War. Are Democracies More 
Pacific”, World Politics, no. 44 (1992): 253–261.
19 Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?”, pp. 37 and 41.
real conflict structures in a complex system of states. Secondly, if the absence 
of conflicts between Switzerland and Sweden or between Austria and Israel are 
counted as democratic dyads a very high “n” appears and a large number of 
years without conflict apparently support the democratic peace theory. It only 
makes sense to count those cases where real possibilities and real reasons for 
war existed.20 
Maoz and Abdolali and other authors are convinced that political freedom 
can be measured statistically. They solve the huge methodological problems by 
the definition that democracy and political freedom are identical. For them, vio-
lent conflicts initiated by politically free states are less probable again by defini-
tion, but at the same time these free states are more likely to become victims of 
international aggression by non-free states.21 The first part of the theory can be 
discussed with good reason, but there is not a single argument in favour of the 
second one. Why should dictators be more likely to attack democracies than 
they are to go to war with other forms of states?
Another possible variable, which has been used against the democratic 
peace theory, was identified in geography. Normally wars were fought by ter-
ritorial neighbours and only a few democracies had common borders. Distance 
can play a role because it is expensive and difficult to engage armies in far-away 
regions of the world. With the COW-data and polity II, however, Gleditsch re-
futes the theory that geographical distance could be a possible third factor.22 A 
detailed analysis for the period between 1950 and 1990 has shown that a little 
more than 30 per cent of all borders were disputed and that in the 129 cases 
of disputes nearly 50 per cent escalated to military confrontation, although the 
numbers of real wars were relatively small.23. Until today only very few states 
are able to conduct wars anywhere on the planet.24 Once again the historical 
perspective does not provide clear evidence: in the 19th and 20th centuries, great 
powers did intervene all over the world if their respective governments believed 
their vital interests to be at stake. Great Britain started the Opium War against 
China in 1842 on the other side of the globe, without caring about the Chinese 
form of government, and provoked a war in South Africa in 1899 against the 
relatively democratic Boer republics over the Transvaal goldfields. 
According to Benoit it is obvious that democracies have fewer conflicts 
with each other. However, a correlation between peace and gross domestic prod-
uct shows the same statistical effect for the 1960s and 1970s. If this is the case, 
20 Dülffer, „Internationale Geschichte …“, pp. 256f.
21 Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–
1976”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 33 (1989): 4–7.
22 Niels Peter Gleditsch, “Geography, Democracy, and Peace”, International Interactions, 
no. 20 (1995): 297ff and 316ff; Gleditsch, “Democracy and Peace”: 371f.
23 Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground. Territorial Disputes and International Conflict 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 34 and 69.
24 Gleditsch, “Geography, Democracy, and Peace”: 301.
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development rather than democracy could be the decisive factor. Benoit solves 
the problem by the argument that democracies are regularly more developed 
and development is a precondition for democracy. Thus it is not the economy 
but the type of regime that provides the explanation for peace.25
Neither the factor “war” nor the concept of “democracy” is easy to define. 
Automatically the danger of a tautology appears. Owen criticises that since the 
causal mechanisms behind democratic peace are less than clear, peace might as 
well be the by-product of other variables still unknown.26 Ray shares the opin-
ion that detailed future analysis could identify an unknown third factor.27 For 
Gleditsch, however, it is an open question, why such a simple fact that democ-
racies do not wage war on one another had not already been discovered in the 
great classical studies about wars. Why did it take more than thirty years until 
this simple rule gained widespread acceptance? According to Gleditsch one pos-
sible explanation is that the idea that a single variable was sufficient to explain 
such complicated questions as war and peace seemed to be ridiculously naïve. 
Gleditsch is sure that the search for a third variable will meet with little success. 
Most of the previous research into the conditions for war and peace in the mod-
ern world could now be thrown on the scrap-heap of history, and any analysis 
would have to start from a completely new basis.28
PERPETUAl PEACE AS A UTOPIAN CONSTRUCTION
The hope that war could be abolished is as old as mankind. From the early 
modern period onwards, several theorists of classical philosophy established the 
problem in political thought; they investigated whether a long-lasting peaceful 
order were possible in the anarchic international state system. The Duc de Sully, 
Abbé de Saint-Piérre, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and of course Hugo Grotius dis-
cussed the definitions of “just” and “unjust” wars and indirectly the additional 
matter of how and under which circumstances wars could be prevented. Very 
little research has been conducted into the Enlightenment’s political philosophy 
and its understandings of war and peace. Most of the democratic peace theorists 
refer to Immanuel Kant’s short text “Zum ewigen Frieden” [Perpetual Peace] as 
the first classical and relevant contribution to the problem. This is not the place 
to present Kant’s ideas once more – this has been done very often and at a high 
25 Kenneth Benoit, “Democracies Really Are More Pacific in General. Re-examining 
Regime Type and War Involvement”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 40 (1996): 
651.
26 Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace”: 87f.
27 Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?”, p. 36.
28 Gleditsch, “Democracy and Peace”: 370ff; Gleditsch and Hegre, “Peace and 
Democracy”: 291.
level of analysis.29 Until today, many authors disagree over the issue of whether 
Kant’s concept of republics was identical with democracies. His text about the 
perpetual peace was strongly linked with another earlier article about “Idee zu 
einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht” [Idea for a Universal 
History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective], which is seldom quoted even today, 
but remains one of the most fascinating texts of German political philosophy. 
In this article, Kant constructs a perfect model for a republic, or constitutional 
monarchy based on reason and law and not on violence and force. A further 
aspect which has not been discussed in most English language studies, is the 
fact that Kant uses the German word “ewiger Friede”, which in German means 
both, “perpetual” and “eternal peace”. The German text has a much more uto-
pian character than the English translations. For Kant and for his contemporary 
readers, it was clear that he wrote about a hypothetic, utopian world in a far 
away future, because at his time, only two (USA and Switzerland) republics or 
democracies existed, even if one could also adduce the first years of revolution-
ary France before the “terror” and the rise of Napoleon. 
From a historical point of view, it is of further importance that Kant’s text 
was not regarded as being of central importance among the Enlightenment phi-
losophers. In his time it was in fact not often quoted. The rediscovery of Kant 
took place when democratic peace theorists were looking for past authorities to 
strengthen their arguments. At the end of the 18th century other thinkers were 
more important than Kant. James Madison, too, believed in 1792 that the more 
republics were created, the fewer wars would occur. The growing number of 
republics would cause a revolution in international diplomacy.30 Other contem-
poraries did not share these optimistic views. The most radical critique was for-
mulated by Alexander Hamilton.31 In his “Federalist Papers”, Hamilton found 
the idea of a republican peace simply ridiculous, because in the past, republics 
went to war as often as monarchies. Monarchies as well as republics were ruled 
by human beings. Parliaments were subject to the influence of anger, rivalry, 
hatred and other violent emotions. Ancient Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage 
were republics, and even the trading republics Carthage and Athens were among 
the most warlike states in classical antiquity.32
29 For Kant and the literature on „Zum ewigen Frieden“ Dieter Senghaas, Zum irdischen 
Frieden [On Earthly Peace] (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2004), p. 8; Ernst-Otto 
Czempiel, „Kants Theorem, oder: Warum sind die Demokratien (noch immer) nicht 
friedlich“ [Kant’s Theory, or: Why are Democracies (still) not peaceful?],: Zeitschrift 
für internationale Beziehungen, no. 3 (1996): 79–101.
30 Kegley and Herrmann, “Military interventions and the Democratic Peace”: 2.
31 Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace”: 159.
32 Angela Adams and Willi Paul Adams, eds, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison 
and John Jay, Die Federalist-Artikel. Politische Theorie und Verfassungskommentar 
der amerikanischen Gründerväter [The Federalist Papers. Political Theory and 
Constitutional Commentaries by the American Fathers of the Constitution] 
(Paderborn: Schöningh., 1994), pp. 24–31.
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problem in political thought; they investigated whether a long-lasting peaceful 
order were possible in the anarchic international state system. The Duc de Sully, 
Abbé de Saint-Piérre, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and of course Hugo Grotius dis-
cussed the definitions of “just” and “unjust” wars and indirectly the additional 
matter of how and under which circumstances wars could be prevented. Very 
little research has been conducted into the Enlightenment’s political philosophy 
and its understandings of war and peace. Most of the democratic peace theorists 
refer to Immanuel Kant’s short text “Zum ewigen Frieden” [Perpetual Peace] as 
the first classical and relevant contribution to the problem. This is not the place 
to present Kant’s ideas once more – this has been done very often and at a high 
25 Kenneth Benoit, “Democracies Really Are More Pacific in General. Re-examining 
Regime Type and War Involvement”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 40 (1996): 
651.
26 Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace”: 87f.
27 Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?”, p. 36.
28 Gleditsch, “Democracy and Peace”: 370ff; Gleditsch and Hegre, “Peace and 
Democracy”: 291.
level of analysis.29 Until today, many authors disagree over the issue of whether 
Kant’s concept of republics was identical with democracies. His text about the 
perpetual peace was strongly linked with another earlier article about “Idee zu 
einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht” [Idea for a Universal 
History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective], which is seldom quoted even today, 
but remains one of the most fascinating texts of German political philosophy. 
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monarchy based on reason and law and not on violence and force. A further 
aspect which has not been discussed in most English language studies, is the 
fact that Kant uses the German word “ewiger Friede”, which in German means 
both, “perpetual” and “eternal peace”. The German text has a much more uto-
pian character than the English translations. For Kant and for his contemporary 
readers, it was clear that he wrote about a hypothetic, utopian world in a far 
away future, because at his time, only two (USA and Switzerland) republics or 
democracies existed, even if one could also adduce the first years of revolution-
ary France before the “terror” and the rise of Napoleon. 
From a historical point of view, it is of further importance that Kant’s text 
was not regarded as being of central importance among the Enlightenment phi-
losophers. In his time it was in fact not often quoted. The rediscovery of Kant 
took place when democratic peace theorists were looking for past authorities to 
strengthen their arguments. At the end of the 18th century other thinkers were 
more important than Kant. James Madison, too, believed in 1792 that the more 
republics were created, the fewer wars would occur. The growing number of 
republics would cause a revolution in international diplomacy.30 Other contem-
poraries did not share these optimistic views. The most radical critique was for-
mulated by Alexander Hamilton.31 In his “Federalist Papers”, Hamilton found 
the idea of a republican peace simply ridiculous, because in the past, republics 
went to war as often as monarchies. Monarchies as well as republics were ruled 
by human beings. Parliaments were subject to the influence of anger, rivalry, 
hatred and other violent emotions. Ancient Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage 
were republics, and even the trading republics Carthage and Athens were among 
the most warlike states in classical antiquity.32
29 For Kant and the literature on „Zum ewigen Frieden“ Dieter Senghaas, Zum irdischen 
Frieden [On Earthly Peace] (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 2004), p. 8; Ernst-Otto 
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30 Kegley and Herrmann, “Military interventions and the Democratic Peace”: 2.
31 Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace”: 159.
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Gates argues that Kant is not well suited as a “tribal idol” of the democrat-
ic peace camp, because he never discussed democracies but republics. A much 
clearer contemporary theoretical basis for democratic principles was developed 
by Thomas Paine (1792) and by William Godwin in the “Enquiry Concerning 
Political Justice” (1793). Godwin was perhaps the first author who made a clear 
distinction between the concepts of democracy and republic and created a con-
nection between democracy and peace. He proposed to replace the old militant, 
monarchical balance of power doctrine by an active policy of democratisation, 
because democracies were inherently peaceful. However, this peaceful nature 
would be difficult to prove at the very beginning, because democracies first had 
to fight and to go to war with monarchies.33 Here, for the first time, an author 
came to the conclusion that democratisation and war are strongly linked with 
each other – we will come back to this point. It was Tocqueville who believed 
that – in modern terms – the external conflict behaviour of democracies, led, 
not by rationality but by instable feelings and sentiments, differs strongly from 
autocratic regimes. In spite of his considerable sympathy for the American peo-
ple he was convinced that in foreign policy, a democratic government would be 
in a much weaker position than an aristocratic one, because democratic senti-
ments could lead to superfluous wars and unnecessary aggressions against other 
states.34 Several typical aspects of the modern contemporary democratic peace 
controversy were obviously already the subject of discussion 200 years ago at 
the end of the 18th century – a topic worth further historical scrutiny in the fu-
ture.
THE DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF DEmOCRACy
For Babst, Rummel, and the early versions of the COW project, the concept of 
democracy caused no problems, because they simply used the American model 
as it had developed since the early 18th century. For different observers “democ-
racy”, “intervention”, and “war” mean different things, and no consensus exists 
on how to define a democracy. Most of the authors use the definition of “war”, 
which has been introduced by the United Nations after long and controversial 
debates. War takes place if an armed clash occurs between two actors, at least 
one of them represented by a government, and if at least 1,000 soldiers are 
killed. This definition is used by the COW project and by the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Project (UCDP), but it causes several problems, especially if one deals with 
civil, guerrilla, or colonial wars. 
It is much more difficult to define democracy. James Lee Ray points out 
that it is impossible to classify states in two categories such as “free” or “non-
33 Scott Gates, Torbjörn Knutsen, Jonathon W. Moses, “Democracy and Peace. A More 
Sceptical View”, Journal of Peace Research, no. 33 (1996): 6.
34 Alexis de Tocqueville, Über die Demokratie in Amerika [Democracy in America] 
(München: DTV, 1976), pp. 263ff.
free”. States can be democratic to a higher or lesser degree.35 Aware of the prob-
lems, the “Freedom House Project” and other authors have decided to introduce 
the third category of “partly free states”. The first item (political rights) identi-
fies and classifies eleven categories; the second item (civil rights) also uses eleven 
categories.36 However, these definitions give rise to the same problems, only on 
a much higher level of abstraction, and they do not solve the general question. 
As the democratic peace debate shows, clear definitions are one of the crucial 
points in peace research, whereas these definitions never reflect historical devel-
opments but our contemporary world views. Since when did democracies exist 
and which criteria must be fulfilled to classify a state as democratic? Even today 
our modern forms of well established democracies are not static, but highly dy-
namic societies in a permanent process of development. 
Several authors suggest a huge variety of criteria to identify a democracy. 
Small and Singer propose four points: The fair representation of most social 
classes, the dominance of parliament or at least a partial parliamentary control 
of the executive, at least two parties, each of which has the right to criticise the 
other and a parliament which is elected by a fair section of the adult population. 
Small and Singer conclude that Britain did not fulfil the parliamentary criteria 
before the second reform bill of 1867, Italy not before the election reform of 
1882 and the Netherlands not before 1887.37 A problem in using these four 
criteria is caused by Germany, because it fulfilled all four points after 1871 and 
even a “partial control of the executive” occurred by means of by the parliamen-
tary control over the budget.
Chan suggests the following aspects for the period between 1816 and 1945, 
which he states were necessary preconditions of a free society. The chief execu-
tive must be elected either directly by the people or indirectly by an elected as-
sembly, and this assembly must have the full or partial right to control the exec-
utive. The legislators must be chosen directly or indirectly by popular vote, and 
legal elections for the parliament must take place at least every four years. For 
the time after 1945 an at least partial competitive process of election for the leg-
islative must take place, and the political opposition may not be excluded from 
the election process, apart from some extremist parties.38 Other aspects which 
are mentioned as central to a democracy are freedom of speech and thought, the 
balanced representation of different political opinions in the media and certain 
individual and collective rights.39
35 Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?”, pp. 32f.
36 Charles W. Kegley and Margaret G. Hermann, “Putting Military Intervention into the 
Democratic Peace. A research note”, Comparative Political Studies, no. 30 (1997): 84.
37 Small and Singer, “War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes”: 54f.
38 Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall”: 630.
39 Kegley and Hermann, “Putting military intervention into the democratic peace”: 84.
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individual and collective rights.39
35 Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?”, pp. 32f.
36 Charles W. Kegley and Margaret G. Hermann, “Putting Military Intervention into the 
Democratic Peace. A research note”, Comparative Political Studies, no. 30 (1997): 84.
37 Small and Singer, “War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes”: 54f.
38 Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall”: 630.
39 Kegley and Hermann, “Putting military intervention into the democratic peace”: 84.
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Another aspect is surprisingly rather seldom mentioned in the literature 
about the democratic peace, although it is central for the conflict behaviour 
of states: the political control of the armed forces. From today’s perspective 
perhaps the weakest point of the German constitution of 1871 was the de facto 
autonomy of the army, which was only responsible to the emperor and not to 
any democratic or parliamentary institution. The lack of political control con-
tributed to a very high degree to the fatal decisions which led to the escalation 
of the Balkan Crisis in July 1914 and to the attack on France via Belgium. It was 
not the degree of formal democratisation or mass participation in politics, which 
was rather high in Germany, that was responsible for the outbreak of the First 
World War, but the institutional weakness of the constitution’s arrangement of 
military affairs. In 1914 the general staff and the leadership of the army could 
still act like a “state within the state”. The Prussian construction of an independ-
ent army leadership, which was solely responsible to the emperor, was taken 
over by Japan in the famous Meji Constitution – with exactly the same deleteri-
ous consequences. In principle the Meji Constitution did provide an opening for 
an evolutionary development in a democratic direction, but this process failed 
in the long run. The autonomy of the Japanese army contributed to a very high 
degree to the militarization of society, to the rise of a military form of fascism 
and to the aggression of the 1930s. When the army decided to attack Manchuria 
in 1931, not a single civil politician or official in Tokyo was even informed. 
One aspect which is crucial to the historical definition of a democracy is 
suffrage. In 1812–16, Great Britain was certainly no democracy since no more 
than three per cent of the population had the right to vote. Schweller and other 
authors identify states as democracies, if the suffrage extended to at least 30 per 
cent and if female suffrage was introduced at least one generation after the first 
demands for it were voiced. Further criteria are internal sovereignty over mili-
tary affairs and the foreign policy as well as stability, i.e. the democratic form 
of government must exist for at least three years. Relevant are also individual 
civil rights, private property and a free enterprise economy.40 Ray suggests a 
suffrage of 50 per cent and one peaceful transfer of executive power from one 
independent party to another. These conditions would exclude some doubtful 
cases of democratic wars like the war of 1812, the American Civil War and the 
Spanish-American War of 1898.41 Other authors believe that a 10 per cent suf-
frage is sufficient to meet the democratic criterion.
The difficulty, if not impossibility, involved in elaborating objective cri-
teria to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic societies can be 
demonstrated by the problem of suffrage. Undoubtedly, voting is central to the 
democratic process. Whether one uses criteria of 10 per cent, 30 per cent, or 50 
40 Gleditsch, “Democracy and Peace”: 370.
41 Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?”, p. 33.
per cent, however, is highly arbitrary and depends only on the author’s personal 
preference. It is impossible to read adequate criteria out of history or by inter-
preting the sources. More important than the purely quantitative are the quali-
tative aspects. Is female suffrage central to the concept of democracy? If this 
were the case,  there would have been no democracies at all before World War I, 
France would only have become one after 1944 and some parts of Switzerland 
not before the 1980s. How can states be classified if a huge part of the popula-
tion does not have even basic civil rights for ethnic or racist reasons? Is the type 
of a Herrenvolk democracy such as the Boer republics or many states of the 
USA before the Civil War really democratic? Historically, suffrage has developed 
independently in different ways and in different contexts. 
Firstly, suffrage in European settler communities was widespread from the 
beginning and often every adult male citizen had the right to vote because of the 
lack of traditional aristocracies and authorities. Governmental and bureaucratic 
institutions were weak, as was state control of the society. Here, however, dis-
putes arose over the criteria defining citizenship and over the question of who 
should be allowed to acquire it. Often, aggressive forms of racism and ethnic di-
visions were the result of such debates, an aspect which will be discussed later. 
Secondly, other forms of European democracy were rooted in the early 
modern republics, where no royal central power existed or where royal au-
thority was limited by a constitution, normally after heavy internal disputes or 
even civil wars. Early modern republics were ruled by parliaments which were 
dominated by a few aristocratic or upper-class families, such as early modern 
England, the Dutch Republic, Poland before the partitions, or the Renaissance 
city republics in Northern Italy. Governments and parliaments in North-Western 
Europe accepted conflicts among interest groups within the state and integrated 
them into institutions, but not by suppressing them. The building of strong state 
institutions later became a necessary precondition for the slow rise of liberal 
democratic or radical republican ideas. The slow extension of the suffrage from 
the early 19th century onwards became possible without serious crises or mass 
violence, because reforms did not touch the existing institutions and could be 
carried out within the stable framework of the already existing bureaucracy. 
Thirdly, the oft-quoted case of early modern Switzerland, a very special 
mixture of city republics and peasant traditions of rural democracy can be ne-
glected here, because it did not become an example for other states. 
Fourthly, democracies could be the result of revolutionary developments, 
especially in the case of France or the Italian Risorgimento. Democratisation 
which occurred in the course of a revolutionary process never caused peace but 
invariably resulted in war. 
Without going into details, it can be stated that the rise of democracies 
has nowhere occurred as the result of a planned development. Historically their 
roots differ very much from each other. Democratisation is a highly dynamic 
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Another aspect is surprisingly rather seldom mentioned in the literature 
about the democratic peace, although it is central for the conflict behaviour 
of states: the political control of the armed forces. From today’s perspective 
perhaps the weakest point of the German constitution of 1871 was the de facto 
autonomy of the army, which was only responsible to the emperor and not to 
any democratic or parliamentary institution. The lack of political control con-
tributed to a very high degree to the fatal decisions which led to the escalation 
of the Balkan Crisis in July 1914 and to the attack on France via Belgium. It was 
not the degree of formal democratisation or mass participation in politics, which 
was rather high in Germany, that was responsible for the outbreak of the First 
World War, but the institutional weakness of the constitution’s arrangement of 
military affairs. In 1914 the general staff and the leadership of the army could 
still act like a “state within the state”. The Prussian construction of an independ-
ent army leadership, which was solely responsible to the emperor, was taken 
over by Japan in the famous Meji Constitution – with exactly the same deleteri-
ous consequences. In principle the Meji Constitution did provide an opening for 
an evolutionary development in a democratic direction, but this process failed 
in the long run. The autonomy of the Japanese army contributed to a very high 
degree to the militarization of society, to the rise of a military form of fascism 
and to the aggression of the 1930s. When the army decided to attack Manchuria 
in 1931, not a single civil politician or official in Tokyo was even informed. 
One aspect which is crucial to the historical definition of a democracy is 
suffrage. In 1812–16, Great Britain was certainly no democracy since no more 
than three per cent of the population had the right to vote. Schweller and other 
authors identify states as democracies, if the suffrage extended to at least 30 per 
cent and if female suffrage was introduced at least one generation after the first 
demands for it were voiced. Further criteria are internal sovereignty over mili-
tary affairs and the foreign policy as well as stability, i.e. the democratic form 
of government must exist for at least three years. Relevant are also individual 
civil rights, private property and a free enterprise economy.40 Ray suggests a 
suffrage of 50 per cent and one peaceful transfer of executive power from one 
independent party to another. These conditions would exclude some doubtful 
cases of democratic wars like the war of 1812, the American Civil War and the 
Spanish-American War of 1898.41 Other authors believe that a 10 per cent suf-
frage is sufficient to meet the democratic criterion.
The difficulty, if not impossibility, involved in elaborating objective cri-
teria to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic societies can be 
demonstrated by the problem of suffrage. Undoubtedly, voting is central to the 
democratic process. Whether one uses criteria of 10 per cent, 30 per cent, or 50 
40 Gleditsch, “Democracy and Peace”: 370.
41 Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?”, p. 33.
per cent, however, is highly arbitrary and depends only on the author’s personal 
preference. It is impossible to read adequate criteria out of history or by inter-
preting the sources. More important than the purely quantitative are the quali-
tative aspects. Is female suffrage central to the concept of democracy? If this 
were the case,  there would have been no democracies at all before World War I, 
France would only have become one after 1944 and some parts of Switzerland 
not before the 1980s. How can states be classified if a huge part of the popula-
tion does not have even basic civil rights for ethnic or racist reasons? Is the type 
of a Herrenvolk democracy such as the Boer republics or many states of the 
USA before the Civil War really democratic? Historically, suffrage has developed 
independently in different ways and in different contexts. 
Firstly, suffrage in European settler communities was widespread from the 
beginning and often every adult male citizen had the right to vote because of the 
lack of traditional aristocracies and authorities. Governmental and bureaucratic 
institutions were weak, as was state control of the society. Here, however, dis-
putes arose over the criteria defining citizenship and over the question of who 
should be allowed to acquire it. Often, aggressive forms of racism and ethnic di-
visions were the result of such debates, an aspect which will be discussed later. 
Secondly, other forms of European democracy were rooted in the early 
modern republics, where no royal central power existed or where royal au-
thority was limited by a constitution, normally after heavy internal disputes or 
even civil wars. Early modern republics were ruled by parliaments which were 
dominated by a few aristocratic or upper-class families, such as early modern 
England, the Dutch Republic, Poland before the partitions, or the Renaissance 
city republics in Northern Italy. Governments and parliaments in North-Western 
Europe accepted conflicts among interest groups within the state and integrated 
them into institutions, but not by suppressing them. The building of strong state 
institutions later became a necessary precondition for the slow rise of liberal 
democratic or radical republican ideas. The slow extension of the suffrage from 
the early 19th century onwards became possible without serious crises or mass 
violence, because reforms did not touch the existing institutions and could be 
carried out within the stable framework of the already existing bureaucracy. 
Thirdly, the oft-quoted case of early modern Switzerland, a very special 
mixture of city republics and peasant traditions of rural democracy can be ne-
glected here, because it did not become an example for other states. 
Fourthly, democracies could be the result of revolutionary developments, 
especially in the case of France or the Italian Risorgimento. Democratisation 
which occurred in the course of a revolutionary process never caused peace but 
invariably resulted in war. 
Without going into details, it can be stated that the rise of democracies 
has nowhere occurred as the result of a planned development. Historically their 
roots differ very much from each other. Democratisation is a highly dynamic 
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and often violent process, and no general law exists for the ideal road to the 
perfect state. For methodological reasons the statistical approach has to reduce 
all these complicated and dynamic developments to static formulas. 
Suffrage is easy to measure statistically, but “soft” factors such as mass 
participation in political decision making or the idea of a civilised society are 
perhaps even more important for the democratic development of a society and 
for the question as to whether it tends to seek warlike decisions. Gleditsch and 
Ward argue that not only participation in elections, but also the citizens’ ef-
fective participation in decision making processes belongs to the democratic 
ideal.42 Participation is difficult to measure. If one compares Great Britain with 
Imperial Germany before 1914, the political mobilisation of all social groups in 
Germany was probably much higher than in Britain because of the great number 
of political organisations in all of the different social milieus. The high degree 
of politicisation of public life had also reached the lowest classes. However, as 
many contemporary observers stated at the time, the high degree of political 
organisation did not correspond to a similar level of political responsibility. The 
results were very aggressive demands in foreign policy and the rise of demagogic 
right wing politicians.
There has hitherto been little debate over the question of which forms of 
democracies are more war-prone than others. Democratic constitutions with a 
strong executive may pursue an aggressive foreign policy because of the presi-
dent’s extraordinary position. The French or American presidents are in a much 
stronger position to take decisions on war or peace than – say – the leader of 
Switzerland. The complicated and slow decision making process in a direct de-
mocracy makes the preparation of a war nearly impossible and prevents blood-
thirsty Swiss militia-men from attacking their neighbours. The American presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson, however, was able to conduct the war in Vietnam without 
a formal declaration of war and the Nixon/Kissinger team even ordered heavy 
bombing attacks on neutral Cambodia. During the Vietnam War, Congress and 
the public were hardly informed by the government about backgrounds and de-
velopments. American governments often tried to expand their executive pow-
ers if they expected strong resistance against certain measures, as for example 
was revealed in Ronald Reagan’s “Iran-Contra” affair. 
Especially in times of a crisis presidential powers increased enormously 
and weakened parliamentary or bureaucratic control to the point where it al-
most ceased to exist. The theory that wars in democracies are unlikely because 
of the slow and transparent decision making process, does not really address 
42 Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael Ward, “A Re-examination of Democracy and 
Autocracy in Modern Politics”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 41 (1997): 362.
the central issue.43 As history shows, democratic decisions are not necessarily 
slow.44 During the Cuban crisis of 1962, the whole of the American executive 
power was concentrated in “ExCom”, a group of 12 men under the leadership 
of President Kennedy, which was neither democratically elected nor subject to 
parliamentary control.
The question of the connection between democracy and peace strongly 
depends on definitions. If the threshold definition of democracy is high enough 
one will find very few of them before the era of the Cold War and logically also 
very few wars between them. But even during the Cold War, this fact is better 
explained by NATO and the bipolar stand-off than by the forms of the govern-
ments involved. If the threshold definition is set at a high level, Germany before 
1914 was no democracy, but it is also doubtful whether the United States could 
be described as one and hence the democratic peace occurred in a vacuum: since 
there were no democracies, no wars could occur among them. If one lowers 
the threshold definition the case of Imperial Germany causes serious problems, 
because according to contemporary beliefs it could be classified as democrat-
ic, with the consequence that the First World War was fought between some 
democratic states.45 For Layne the central question is not the general level of 
democratisation in a state, but the democratic or parliamentary influence on 
crucial decisions in foreign policy. According to him, before 1914, Wilhelmine 
Germany was as democratic as France or Great Britain. In all three countries an 
aristocratic or upper-class background and independent wealth were necessary 
preconditions for service in the diplomatic corps or in the respective foreign 
ministries. In all three countries far-reaching decisions in foreign policy were 
taken without the parliament being consulted or even informed.46
The democratic peace theory only works if all forms of non-western and 
non-contemporary democracies are excluded. Was Haiti in 1991 democratic 
and what did Bill Clinton mean exactly when he, in October 1993, asked Haiti 
to return to democracy? Does it really make sense to list Bolivia, Peru, Nigeria, 
and Sri Lanka – liberal regimes according to Michael Doyle – together with the 
Netherlands or Switzerland?47 Democracy alone is a too vague concept to be 
used in an analysis of world history. Some democratic states are not liberal: Iran 
is a state with universal suffrage and fierce parliamentary debates but without 
43 For this argument Harald Müller, Demokratien im Krieg. Antinomien des 
demokratischen Friedens [Democracies at War. The Contradictions of the Democratic 
Peace ], in Demokratien im Krieg [Democracies at War], ed. Christine Schweitzer et.al. 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), p. 35. Har sendt mail til Boris
44 Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace”: 168.
45 Ibid.: 160 and 164f.
46 Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant. The Myth of the Democratic Peace”, International 
Security, no. 19 (1994): 42f.
47 Raymond Cohen, “Pacific Unions. A reappraisal of the theory that ‘democracies do 
not go to war with each other’”, Review of International Studies, no. 20 (1994): 208 
and 212f.
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and often violent process, and no general law exists for the ideal road to the 
perfect state. For methodological reasons the statistical approach has to reduce 
all these complicated and dynamic developments to static formulas. 
Suffrage is easy to measure statistically, but “soft” factors such as mass 
participation in political decision making or the idea of a civilised society are 
perhaps even more important for the democratic development of a society and 
for the question as to whether it tends to seek warlike decisions. Gleditsch and 
Ward argue that not only participation in elections, but also the citizens’ ef-
fective participation in decision making processes belongs to the democratic 
ideal.42 Participation is difficult to measure. If one compares Great Britain with 
Imperial Germany before 1914, the political mobilisation of all social groups in 
Germany was probably much higher than in Britain because of the great number 
of political organisations in all of the different social milieus. The high degree 
of politicisation of public life had also reached the lowest classes. However, as 
many contemporary observers stated at the time, the high degree of political 
organisation did not correspond to a similar level of political responsibility. The 
results were very aggressive demands in foreign policy and the rise of demagogic 
right wing politicians.
There has hitherto been little debate over the question of which forms of 
democracies are more war-prone than others. Democratic constitutions with a 
strong executive may pursue an aggressive foreign policy because of the presi-
dent’s extraordinary position. The French or American presidents are in a much 
stronger position to take decisions on war or peace than – say – the leader of 
Switzerland. The complicated and slow decision making process in a direct de-
mocracy makes the preparation of a war nearly impossible and prevents blood-
thirsty Swiss militia-men from attacking their neighbours. The American presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson, however, was able to conduct the war in Vietnam without 
a formal declaration of war and the Nixon/Kissinger team even ordered heavy 
bombing attacks on neutral Cambodia. During the Vietnam War, Congress and 
the public were hardly informed by the government about backgrounds and de-
velopments. American governments often tried to expand their executive pow-
ers if they expected strong resistance against certain measures, as for example 
was revealed in Ronald Reagan’s “Iran-Contra” affair. 
Especially in times of a crisis presidential powers increased enormously 
and weakened parliamentary or bureaucratic control to the point where it al-
most ceased to exist. The theory that wars in democracies are unlikely because 
of the slow and transparent decision making process, does not really address 
42 Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael Ward, “A Re-examination of Democracy and 
Autocracy in Modern Politics”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, no. 41 (1997): 362.
the central issue.43 As history shows, democratic decisions are not necessarily 
slow.44 During the Cuban crisis of 1962, the whole of the American executive 
power was concentrated in “ExCom”, a group of 12 men under the leadership 
of President Kennedy, which was neither democratically elected nor subject to 
parliamentary control.
The question of the connection between democracy and peace strongly 
depends on definitions. If the threshold definition of democracy is high enough 
one will find very few of them before the era of the Cold War and logically also 
very few wars between them. But even during the Cold War, this fact is better 
explained by NATO and the bipolar stand-off than by the forms of the govern-
ments involved. If the threshold definition is set at a high level, Germany before 
1914 was no democracy, but it is also doubtful whether the United States could 
be described as one and hence the democratic peace occurred in a vacuum: since 
there were no democracies, no wars could occur among them. If one lowers 
the threshold definition the case of Imperial Germany causes serious problems, 
because according to contemporary beliefs it could be classified as democrat-
ic, with the consequence that the First World War was fought between some 
democratic states.45 For Layne the central question is not the general level of 
democratisation in a state, but the democratic or parliamentary influence on 
crucial decisions in foreign policy. According to him, before 1914, Wilhelmine 
Germany was as democratic as France or Great Britain. In all three countries an 
aristocratic or upper-class background and independent wealth were necessary 
preconditions for service in the diplomatic corps or in the respective foreign 
ministries. In all three countries far-reaching decisions in foreign policy were 
taken without the parliament being consulted or even informed.46
The democratic peace theory only works if all forms of non-western and 
non-contemporary democracies are excluded. Was Haiti in 1991 democratic 
and what did Bill Clinton mean exactly when he, in October 1993, asked Haiti 
to return to democracy? Does it really make sense to list Bolivia, Peru, Nigeria, 
and Sri Lanka – liberal regimes according to Michael Doyle – together with the 
Netherlands or Switzerland?47 Democracy alone is a too vague concept to be 
used in an analysis of world history. Some democratic states are not liberal: Iran 
is a state with universal suffrage and fierce parliamentary debates but without 
43 For this argument Harald Müller, Demokratien im Krieg. Antinomien des 
demokratischen Friedens [Democracies at War. The Contradictions of the Democratic 
Peace ], in Demokratien im Krieg [Democracies at War], ed. Christine Schweitzer et.al. 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), p. 35. Har sendt mail til Boris
44 Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace”: 168.
45 Ibid.: 160 and 164f.
46 Christopher Layne, “Kant or Cant. The Myth of the Democratic Peace”, International 
Security, no. 19 (1994): 42f.
47 Raymond Cohen, “Pacific Unions. A reappraisal of the theory that ‘democracies do 
not go to war with each other’”, Review of International Studies, no. 20 (1994): 208 
and 212f.
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liberal world views or religious tolerance. The Confederation in the American 
Civil War was a democracy but not liberal as well. Some states with liberal ele-
ments were undemocratic such as Great Britain before the great Reform Bill of 
1832. In Owen’s opinion, democracies do not avoid wars with other democra-
cies, but only with states which are perceived as liberal.48 
For Arend Lijphart and others no real democracies existed before the 20th 
century. Australia and New Zealand were the first states with a fully democratic 
regime, firm popular control of governmental institutions and universal adult 
suffrage. For 1980 he identifies 51 democracies, although some of them were 
without long established democratic institutions, which had survived serious 
crises. If one applies these criteria, Upper Volta and Surinam must be sorted 
out, while Spain passed the test in 1981. If the criterion of stability is added, 
the number is reduced to 21, and with the exception of Australia, India, Israel, 
Japan and New Zealand, all are in the Northern Atlantic and the Western Euro-
pean region.49 Jost Dülffer shares the opinion that developed democratic systems 
are the product of the 20th century. Formal rules for democracy did exist in the 
19th century, but the social and welfare state effected a qualitative transforma-
tion of the term in the 20th. The COW and polity data’s interpretation prompt 
the sceptical question as to whether any use of the concept of democracy makes 
sense before 1918 or even before 1945.50 
ExCEPTIONS AND POSSIBlE REASONS FOR DEmOCRATIC PEACE
Wars between democracies are very rare indeed, but it does not follow that none 
ever occurred. Some authors believe that a single exception to the rule would de-
stroy the whole DP theory; others think that some exceptions could be accepted 
without giving up the broad concept of the democratic peace.51 A great number 
of cases of wars between democracies have been discussed and it is not possible 
to list all of them here. Only some typical pro- and counter arguments will be 
mentioned. If the United States of America was a democracy in the middle of the 
19th century, then the American Civil War was a war between two democracies, 
too.52 Both states had established democratic governments with full control of 
a certain territory, and the constitutions were very similar. If the theory is right 
that democracies share common cultural values and norms, civil wars within an 
existing democracy would be impossible. The secession meant a break-up of the 
constitution, but it was made legitimate by the voters or the respective parlia-
ments in a democratic or republican way.
48 Owen, “How Liberalism produces Democratic Peace”: 98 and 102f.
49 Cohen, “Pacific Unions”: 211.
50 Dülffer, „Internationale Geschichte …“, p. 256.
51 James Lee Ray, “Wars between Democracies: rare or nonexistent?”, International 
Interactions, no. 18 (1993): 251–276; Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the 
Democratic Peace”: 161f.
52 Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace”: 164.
Other wars which cause serious problems for the definitions of war and de-
mocracy are the Anglo-Boer War of 1899, the Spanish-American War of 1898, 
the French Ruhr occupation of 1923, Finland’s participation in the Second World 
War on the Axis’ side, the border war between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, the 
Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999 and a number of other conflicts. 
Palestine must also be considered a hypothetical case, a democratic government 
which would go to war with democratic Israel at once, if it had the necessary 
military force. Most of the possible exceptions were analysed by Spencer Weart, 
who came to the conclusion that they are either theoretically irrelevant or that 
they prove the rule.53 Several authors doubt whether Spain was a real democracy 
in 189854, but as to the question of why the United States started the war, the 
perception of the other state’s form of government was more important than its 
reality. 
It is not sufficient to analyse conflicts between democracies; peace research 
must first ask the question whether and why democracies go to war at all. The 
democratic peace theory must explain the paradoxical situation that democra-
cies fight as many or even more wars than non-free societies, although they do 
not do so against each other. Democracies behave rather intolerantly, sometimes 
even belligerently towards autocratic regimes or dictatorial states. It is highly 
controversial how to interpret these findings, but they must be integrated into 
one theory. Chojnacki is sure that it speaks against a systematic connection be-
tween war and regime type of individual states. Additionally it is striking that 
the growing number of democracies since the early 1990s does not seem to have 
any effect on the degree of violence in the international system.55 
Some authors even believe that democratic systems initiate and conduct 
wars and other military interventions with a higher probability than other types 
of regimes.56 According to them, no external reasons are responsible for spe-
cial forms of democratic violence, which can become extremely aggressive. The 
motivation stems from a specific democratic self-confidence, respect for human 
rights, open debates and the peaceful solution of internal conflicts. When dealing 
with non-democratic states this democratic self-understanding combined with 
the perception that democracies have reached already a higher level of civilisa-
tion, becomes the reason for aggression. Müller calls this paradox the antinomy 
53 Weart, Never at War, pp. 297–318.
54 Gleditsch and Hegre, “Democracy and Peace”: 288.
55 Chojnacki, „Demokratien und Krieg“, p. 75; Christopher Daase, „Demokratischer 
Frieden – Demokratischer Krieg. Drei Gründe für die Unfriedlichkeit von 
Demokratien“ [Democratic Peace – Democratic War. Three Reasons for the 
Belligerence of Democracies], in Demokratien im Krieg, ed. Christine Schweitzer, p. 
53f.; similar: Benoit, “Democracies really are more Pacific …”: 636.
56 Chojnacki, „Demokratien und Krieg“, p. 75f. 
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liberal world views or religious tolerance. The Confederation in the American 
Civil War was a democracy but not liberal as well. Some states with liberal ele-
ments were undemocratic such as Great Britain before the great Reform Bill of 
1832. In Owen’s opinion, democracies do not avoid wars with other democra-
cies, but only with states which are perceived as liberal.48 
For Arend Lijphart and others no real democracies existed before the 20th 
century. Australia and New Zealand were the first states with a fully democratic 
regime, firm popular control of governmental institutions and universal adult 
suffrage. For 1980 he identifies 51 democracies, although some of them were 
without long established democratic institutions, which had survived serious 
crises. If one applies these criteria, Upper Volta and Surinam must be sorted 
out, while Spain passed the test in 1981. If the criterion of stability is added, 
the number is reduced to 21, and with the exception of Australia, India, Israel, 
Japan and New Zealand, all are in the Northern Atlantic and the Western Euro-
pean region.49 Jost Dülffer shares the opinion that developed democratic systems 
are the product of the 20th century. Formal rules for democracy did exist in the 
19th century, but the social and welfare state effected a qualitative transforma-
tion of the term in the 20th. The COW and polity data’s interpretation prompt 
the sceptical question as to whether any use of the concept of democracy makes 
sense before 1918 or even before 1945.50 
ExCEPTIONS AND POSSIBlE REASONS FOR DEmOCRATIC PEACE
Wars between democracies are very rare indeed, but it does not follow that none 
ever occurred. Some authors believe that a single exception to the rule would de-
stroy the whole DP theory; others think that some exceptions could be accepted 
without giving up the broad concept of the democratic peace.51 A great number 
of cases of wars between democracies have been discussed and it is not possible 
to list all of them here. Only some typical pro- and counter arguments will be 
mentioned. If the United States of America was a democracy in the middle of the 
19th century, then the American Civil War was a war between two democracies, 
too.52 Both states had established democratic governments with full control of 
a certain territory, and the constitutions were very similar. If the theory is right 
that democracies share common cultural values and norms, civil wars within an 
existing democracy would be impossible. The secession meant a break-up of the 
constitution, but it was made legitimate by the voters or the respective parlia-
ments in a democratic or republican way.
48 Owen, “How Liberalism produces Democratic Peace”: 98 and 102f.
49 Cohen, “Pacific Unions”: 211.
50 Dülffer, „Internationale Geschichte …“, p. 256.
51 James Lee Ray, “Wars between Democracies: rare or nonexistent?”, International 
Interactions, no. 18 (1993): 251–276; Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the 
Democratic Peace”: 161f.
52 Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace”: 164.
Other wars which cause serious problems for the definitions of war and de-
mocracy are the Anglo-Boer War of 1899, the Spanish-American War of 1898, 
the French Ruhr occupation of 1923, Finland’s participation in the Second World 
War on the Axis’ side, the border war between Peru and Ecuador in 1995, the 
Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999 and a number of other conflicts. 
Palestine must also be considered a hypothetical case, a democratic government 
which would go to war with democratic Israel at once, if it had the necessary 
military force. Most of the possible exceptions were analysed by Spencer Weart, 
who came to the conclusion that they are either theoretically irrelevant or that 
they prove the rule.53 Several authors doubt whether Spain was a real democracy 
in 189854, but as to the question of why the United States started the war, the 
perception of the other state’s form of government was more important than its 
reality. 
It is not sufficient to analyse conflicts between democracies; peace research 
must first ask the question whether and why democracies go to war at all. The 
democratic peace theory must explain the paradoxical situation that democra-
cies fight as many or even more wars than non-free societies, although they do 
not do so against each other. Democracies behave rather intolerantly, sometimes 
even belligerently towards autocratic regimes or dictatorial states. It is highly 
controversial how to interpret these findings, but they must be integrated into 
one theory. Chojnacki is sure that it speaks against a systematic connection be-
tween war and regime type of individual states. Additionally it is striking that 
the growing number of democracies since the early 1990s does not seem to have 
any effect on the degree of violence in the international system.55 
Some authors even believe that democratic systems initiate and conduct 
wars and other military interventions with a higher probability than other types 
of regimes.56 According to them, no external reasons are responsible for spe-
cial forms of democratic violence, which can become extremely aggressive. The 
motivation stems from a specific democratic self-confidence, respect for human 
rights, open debates and the peaceful solution of internal conflicts. When dealing 
with non-democratic states this democratic self-understanding combined with 
the perception that democracies have reached already a higher level of civilisa-
tion, becomes the reason for aggression. Müller calls this paradox the antinomy 
53 Weart, Never at War, pp. 297–318.
54 Gleditsch and Hegre, “Democracy and Peace”: 288.
55 Chojnacki, „Demokratien und Krieg“, p. 75; Christopher Daase, „Demokratischer 
Frieden – Demokratischer Krieg. Drei Gründe für die Unfriedlichkeit von 
Demokratien“ [Democratic Peace – Democratic War. Three Reasons for the 
Belligerence of Democracies], in Demokratien im Krieg, ed. Christine Schweitzer, p. 
53f.; similar: Benoit, “Democracies really are more Pacific …”: 636.
56 Chojnacki, „Demokratien und Krieg“, p. 75f. 
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of democratic peace.57 Henderson goes so far as to claim that the democratic 
peace is nothing but an illusion: “The findings using an explicitly state level 
research design indicate not only that democracies are not more peaceful, but 
that they are in fact significantly more likely to become involved in – and initiate 
– interstate wars and militarized international disputes.”58 Risse argues that the 
aggressiveness of democratic states results from the fact that democracies to a 
large degree create their enemies and their friends by their own definitions.59 
The same institutions which prevent democracies from going to war with 
one another promote an aggressive behaviour in conflicts with non-democracies. 
The same normative values which are shared by all democrats make wars with 
dictators more probable and more inexorable. An aggressive foreign policy can 
even be promoted by the special role of public opinion and interest groups, which 
are inseparable parts of an open society. Democratic wars tend to be more radi-
cal than wars between autocrats. The high degree of mass mobilisation, which is 
necessary in democracies to generate the consensus needed to go to war, makes it 
more difficult to arrive at a compromise peace. Conflicts with non-democracies 
tend to become basic decisions about liberty rights and forms of governments. 
This aspect of people’s war was already discovered by Clausewitz.60 
The normative theory neglects the level of perceptions. During the 19th 
century most Americans did not think in terms of democracies, but of republics 
confronted with monarchies. During the crisis of 1873 many Americans were 
against a war with Spain, because Spain was regarded as a republic, too. It is 
nearly impossible to analyse this aspect of perceptions with quantitative meth-
ods alone. In the USA during the 19th century, Britain, Spain, or France were 
sometimes regarded as republics – in which case the readiness to risk conflicts 
declined – and sometimes not. Even Stalin became “Uncle Joe” in the USA in 
the Second World War, when the alliance with the Soviet Union needed public 
justification.61 
Bruno de Mesquita and other authors have put forward the institutional 
argument that democracies have to pay materially relatively big winning coali-
tions. A defeat in a war means at the same time the loss of power for the govern-
ment, but democratic politicians wish to stay in office. Hence, they will only risk 
57 Müller, „Demokratien im Krieg“, p. 40f; Werner Ruf, „Wir und die anderen. 
Demokratischer Anspruch und hegemoniale Arroganz“ [We and the Others. 
Democratic Claims and Hegemonic Arrogance], in Demokratien im Krieg, ed. 
Christine Schweitzer, p. 127.
58 Errol A. Henderson, Democracy and War. The End of an Illusion? (London: 
Eurospan, 2002), p. 17.
59 Thomas Risse, “Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist 
Interpretation of the Liberal Argument”, in Democratic Peace. Myth or Reality for 
Europe, eds. Gustaaf Geeraerts and Patrick Stouthuysen (Brussels: VUB University 
Press, 1999), pp. 19f.
60 Daase, „Demokratischer Frieden …“, pp. 54f and 60.
61 Owen, “How Liberalism produces Democratic Peace”: 91–97.
a war if the chances for success are high enough.62 The logic of this argument is 
not convincing. Empirical evidence shows that military dictatorships engage in 
few military adventures, because of their fragile internal power structure. With 
some very few exceptions, military dictators have been pacific in external rela-
tions.63 The argument that it is easier for autocrats to stand losses in a war is 
only partly correct. All politicians – no matter whether democrats or dictators 
– normally wish to stay in office and avoid excessive risks in foreign policy.64 
Democratic leaders risk their jobs, whereas dictators risk their heads, and the 
personal risk for democrats is small compared with that of autocrats. The deci-
sion to enter a major war with potentially high losses is definitely more difficult 
in a democracy. But this may change if vital national interests, freedom, or an 
empire are at stake. If a consensus for a war has been found in a democratic 
society and is accepted by the opposition and the majority of the population, a 
democracy is even able to stand extreme difficulties without internal suppres-
sion. In 1916, British society accepted horrible casualties during the Somme 
disaster and Lloyd George refused to hold out any hope for peace by his famous 
“knock-out-blow” interview.
Another attempt to explain the empirical regularities of the democratic 
peace argues that in democracies politicians are used to search for compromise 
solutions. Their normative actions always take place within the framework of 
limited competition, and democratic procedures make unilateral action on the 
part of leaders impossible.65 Common norms contribute to the development of 
positive perceptions of other democracies. The absence of such norms in non-
democracies could explain the paradoxical fact that democracies conduct as 
many wars as non-democracies but seldom against each other.66 In conflicts be-
tween democracies the option of sudden attacks is excluded. This contributes 
to peace in the international system, because leaders in other states are aware 
that they do not have to be afraid of surprise attack even during times of serious 
diplomatic disputes. It is not necessary to calculate the probability of preven-
tive wars. The normative theory explains the solution of several conflicts as the 
result of rational political or economic deliberation. The explanatory power of 
this theory is, however, limited if – as in the 19th and early 20th centuries – irra-
tional tendencies like nationalism tend to structure conflicts. 
62 Bruce Bruno de Mesquita et. al. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic 
Peace”, American Political Science Review no. 93 (1999): 793; Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., “Testing Competing Institutional Explanations of the Democratic 
Peace. The case of dispute duration”, Conflict Management and Peace Science, no. 21 
(2004): 255; Chojnacki, „Demokratien und Krieg“, pp. 89f.
63 Stanislav Andreski, Wars, Revolutions, Dictatorships. Studies of Historical and 
Contemporary Problems from a Comparative Viewpoint (London: Cass, 1992), pp. 
103–113; Gates et.al., “Democracy and Peace”: 3.
64 Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?”, p. 41.
65 Mesquita et al., “An Institutional Explanation …”: 791ff.
66 Layne, “Kant or Cant”: 9f.
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of democratic peace.57 Henderson goes so far as to claim that the democratic 
peace is nothing but an illusion: “The findings using an explicitly state level 
research design indicate not only that democracies are not more peaceful, but 
that they are in fact significantly more likely to become involved in – and initiate 
– interstate wars and militarized international disputes.”58 Risse argues that the 
aggressiveness of democratic states results from the fact that democracies to a 
large degree create their enemies and their friends by their own definitions.59 
The same institutions which prevent democracies from going to war with 
one another promote an aggressive behaviour in conflicts with non-democracies. 
The same normative values which are shared by all democrats make wars with 
dictators more probable and more inexorable. An aggressive foreign policy can 
even be promoted by the special role of public opinion and interest groups, which 
are inseparable parts of an open society. Democratic wars tend to be more radi-
cal than wars between autocrats. The high degree of mass mobilisation, which is 
necessary in democracies to generate the consensus needed to go to war, makes it 
more difficult to arrive at a compromise peace. Conflicts with non-democracies 
tend to become basic decisions about liberty rights and forms of governments. 
This aspect of people’s war was already discovered by Clausewitz.60 
The normative theory neglects the level of perceptions. During the 19th 
century most Americans did not think in terms of democracies, but of republics 
confronted with monarchies. During the crisis of 1873 many Americans were 
against a war with Spain, because Spain was regarded as a republic, too. It is 
nearly impossible to analyse this aspect of perceptions with quantitative meth-
ods alone. In the USA during the 19th century, Britain, Spain, or France were 
sometimes regarded as republics – in which case the readiness to risk conflicts 
declined – and sometimes not. Even Stalin became “Uncle Joe” in the USA in 
the Second World War, when the alliance with the Soviet Union needed public 
justification.61 
Bruno de Mesquita and other authors have put forward the institutional 
argument that democracies have to pay materially relatively big winning coali-
tions. A defeat in a war means at the same time the loss of power for the govern-
ment, but democratic politicians wish to stay in office. Hence, they will only risk 
57 Müller, „Demokratien im Krieg“, p. 40f; Werner Ruf, „Wir und die anderen. 
Demokratischer Anspruch und hegemoniale Arroganz“ [We and the Others. 
Democratic Claims and Hegemonic Arrogance], in Demokratien im Krieg, ed. 
Christine Schweitzer, p. 127.
58 Errol A. Henderson, Democracy and War. The End of an Illusion? (London: 
Eurospan, 2002), p. 17.
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a war if the chances for success are high enough.62 The logic of this argument is 
not convincing. Empirical evidence shows that military dictatorships engage in 
few military adventures, because of their fragile internal power structure. With 
some very few exceptions, military dictators have been pacific in external rela-
tions.63 The argument that it is easier for autocrats to stand losses in a war is 
only partly correct. All politicians – no matter whether democrats or dictators 
– normally wish to stay in office and avoid excessive risks in foreign policy.64 
Democratic leaders risk their jobs, whereas dictators risk their heads, and the 
personal risk for democrats is small compared with that of autocrats. The deci-
sion to enter a major war with potentially high losses is definitely more difficult 
in a democracy. But this may change if vital national interests, freedom, or an 
empire are at stake. If a consensus for a war has been found in a democratic 
society and is accepted by the opposition and the majority of the population, a 
democracy is even able to stand extreme difficulties without internal suppres-
sion. In 1916, British society accepted horrible casualties during the Somme 
disaster and Lloyd George refused to hold out any hope for peace by his famous 
“knock-out-blow” interview.
Another attempt to explain the empirical regularities of the democratic 
peace argues that in democracies politicians are used to search for compromise 
solutions. Their normative actions always take place within the framework of 
limited competition, and democratic procedures make unilateral action on the 
part of leaders impossible.65 Common norms contribute to the development of 
positive perceptions of other democracies. The absence of such norms in non-
democracies could explain the paradoxical fact that democracies conduct as 
many wars as non-democracies but seldom against each other.66 In conflicts be-
tween democracies the option of sudden attacks is excluded. This contributes 
to peace in the international system, because leaders in other states are aware 
that they do not have to be afraid of surprise attack even during times of serious 
diplomatic disputes. It is not necessary to calculate the probability of preven-
tive wars. The normative theory explains the solution of several conflicts as the 
result of rational political or economic deliberation. The explanatory power of 
this theory is, however, limited if – as in the 19th and early 20th centuries – irra-
tional tendencies like nationalism tend to structure conflicts. 
62 Bruce Bruno de Mesquita et. al. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic 
Peace”, American Political Science Review no. 93 (1999): 793; Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., “Testing Competing Institutional Explanations of the Democratic 
Peace. The case of dispute duration”, Conflict Management and Peace Science, no. 21 
(2004): 255; Chojnacki, „Demokratien und Krieg“, pp. 89f.
63 Stanislav Andreski, Wars, Revolutions, Dictatorships. Studies of Historical and 
Contemporary Problems from a Comparative Viewpoint (London: Cass, 1992), pp. 
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OF_1_2008_Innhold.indd   21 06-02-08   11:04:09
22 OSlO FIlES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy 1/2008 The DemOcraTIc peace cONTrOverSy
The theories of interdependency explain the democratic peace with eco-
nomic factors. According to this theoretical approach democracies have open 
markets and trade more than other political systems. Close economic ties be-
tween countries contribute to a higher potential for the resolution of conflicts, 
because channels of communication and structures of cooperation are created. 
International trade makes wars too costly and has a pacifying effect. Trade also 
creates common interests with other states.67 This theory contains a high ana-
lytical potential, because close financial and economic ties between countries in 
principle do have a de-escalating effect: both sides have more to lose than they 
have to gain. In many respect the observation is correct, but for three reasons 
not in its universalistic form. 
Firstly, if the theory of the pacifying effect of trade were always correct in 
history, the First World War could have not broken out. During the three dec-
ades before World War I, irrespective of the different forms of government, the 
world economy was integrating to a degree which had never occurred before in 
history. Many economic historians correctly speak of a first wave of globalisa-
tion which came to an end in 1914. Despite the many sources which document 
a growing trade rivalry between Germany and Great Britain, the two countries 
were each other’s best customers. Before 1914 many German economists, scien-
tists, and bankers were sure that because of these close ties a war between them 
would be impossible. They were not right. Close financial ties and trade may 
promote peace in many cases, but trade does not do so automatically.
Secondly, the idea that democracies have open markets is not correct in a 
historical perspective. The introduction of economic protection does not cor-
respond with a particular form of government. Before the First World War the 
USA was one of the most protectionist states in the world with extremely high 
tariffs. At the same time the US government pressed successfully for the opening 
of Asian markets partly by using military force and the ideology of the “open 
door”. Democratic France systematically closed its own markets and its colonial 
empire to foreign competitors. Although protectionist tariffs were also known 
in Imperial Germany – with the short exception of absolute free trade during the 
1870s – before World War I, the economic policy of autocratic Germany was 
much more liberal than those of the democratic United States. 
Thirdly, even extremely liberal forms of a free trade policy can become very 
aggressive towards other states, too. The question of free trade and the freedom 
of the seas was responsible for the Anglo-American war of 1812. With good 
reason Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher used the paradoxical term of the 
67 Erik Gartzke, “Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins 
of the Democratic Peace”, American Journal of Political Science, no. 42 (1998): 5; 
Ray, “Does Democracy Causes Peace?”, p. 40; Müller, „Demokratien im Krieg“, p. 
35.
“Imperialism of Free Trade” in their famous article of 1953.68 Since the early 
19th century the British Empire expanded rapidly by using free trade and private 
chartered companies as central instruments of power. The economic policy of 
European democracies and autocracies during the inter-war period did not differ 
from each other, but was dictated by the predicaments and dilemmas caused by 
the outcome of the First World War and the Paris peace conferences. Democ-
racies had no open markets – on the contrary. Even the European Union, the 
most successful democratic free trade project in recent history, uses protectionist 
measures and tariffs from time to time. 
NATIONAlISm, lIBERAlISm, AND THE DANGERS OF THE TRANSFORmATION PROCESS
Many authors claim that there is a direct connection between liberalism and 
peace. “Liberalism is universalistic and tolerant” – as Owen puts it.69 John 
Keane shares the opinion that violence is inconsistent with the spirit and the 
substance of democracies. Contemporary democracies are based on civil socie-
ties which show a strong tendency to avoid violence.70 The last observation may 
be correct, but the concept of “civil society” was not known in the 19th century. 
The modern forms of civil societies and welfare states have roots in the 1920s, 
but did not develop before the end of the Second World War. The liberal spirit 
may explain why, in the present day, wars between democracies are unlikely, but 
it contributes nothing to an historical explanation – on the contrary. The argu-
ment becomes tautological: a civil society is defined by the absence of violence, 
and if violence is not absent, it is no civil society. 
Stable modern democracies do not appear overnight, but they develop dur-
ing a long and often stormy transition period. During this process of transition, 
mass politics is often mixed up with traditional authoritarian elite policy, and 
foreign policy is only partly controlled by elected institutions. Democratising 
systems become – according to Mansfield and Snyder – more aggressive, not 
more peaceful.71 The rise of the European 19th century liberal movements was 
closely linked to new forms of popular nationalism and to the rise of the aggres-
sive national state. In the Italian Risorgimento, democratic, liberal, nationalistic, 
and expansionist ideas became parts of the same ideology. Before the rise of 
Napoleon in the German speaking countries, no common identities existed. The 
popular feeling of being part of one nation resulted directly from the French 
occupation and the wars of liberation. Anti-monarchic nationalist ideas could 
become extremely aggressive if they were able to influence foreign policy. In 
68 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, Economic 
History Review, no. 6 (1953): 1–15.
69 Owen, “How Liberalism produces Democratic Peace”: 93.
70 John Keane, Violence and Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
pp. 1 and 4.
71 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”, 
International Security, no. 20 (1995): 5.
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The theories of interdependency explain the democratic peace with eco-
nomic factors. According to this theoretical approach democracies have open 
markets and trade more than other political systems. Close economic ties be-
tween countries contribute to a higher potential for the resolution of conflicts, 
because channels of communication and structures of cooperation are created. 
International trade makes wars too costly and has a pacifying effect. Trade also 
creates common interests with other states.67 This theory contains a high ana-
lytical potential, because close financial and economic ties between countries in 
principle do have a de-escalating effect: both sides have more to lose than they 
have to gain. In many respect the observation is correct, but for three reasons 
not in its universalistic form. 
Firstly, if the theory of the pacifying effect of trade were always correct in 
history, the First World War could have not broken out. During the three dec-
ades before World War I, irrespective of the different forms of government, the 
world economy was integrating to a degree which had never occurred before in 
history. Many economic historians correctly speak of a first wave of globalisa-
tion which came to an end in 1914. Despite the many sources which document 
a growing trade rivalry between Germany and Great Britain, the two countries 
were each other’s best customers. Before 1914 many German economists, scien-
tists, and bankers were sure that because of these close ties a war between them 
would be impossible. They were not right. Close financial ties and trade may 
promote peace in many cases, but trade does not do so automatically.
Secondly, the idea that democracies have open markets is not correct in a 
historical perspective. The introduction of economic protection does not cor-
respond with a particular form of government. Before the First World War the 
USA was one of the most protectionist states in the world with extremely high 
tariffs. At the same time the US government pressed successfully for the opening 
of Asian markets partly by using military force and the ideology of the “open 
door”. Democratic France systematically closed its own markets and its colonial 
empire to foreign competitors. Although protectionist tariffs were also known 
in Imperial Germany – with the short exception of absolute free trade during the 
1870s – before World War I, the economic policy of autocratic Germany was 
much more liberal than those of the democratic United States. 
Thirdly, even extremely liberal forms of a free trade policy can become very 
aggressive towards other states, too. The question of free trade and the freedom 
of the seas was responsible for the Anglo-American war of 1812. With good 
reason Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher used the paradoxical term of the 
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“Imperialism of Free Trade” in their famous article of 1953.68 Since the early 
19th century the British Empire expanded rapidly by using free trade and private 
chartered companies as central instruments of power. The economic policy of 
European democracies and autocracies during the inter-war period did not differ 
from each other, but was dictated by the predicaments and dilemmas caused by 
the outcome of the First World War and the Paris peace conferences. Democ-
racies had no open markets – on the contrary. Even the European Union, the 
most successful democratic free trade project in recent history, uses protectionist 
measures and tariffs from time to time. 
NATIONAlISm, lIBERAlISm, AND THE DANGERS OF THE TRANSFORmATION PROCESS
Many authors claim that there is a direct connection between liberalism and 
peace. “Liberalism is universalistic and tolerant” – as Owen puts it.69 John 
Keane shares the opinion that violence is inconsistent with the spirit and the 
substance of democracies. Contemporary democracies are based on civil socie-
ties which show a strong tendency to avoid violence.70 The last observation may 
be correct, but the concept of “civil society” was not known in the 19th century. 
The modern forms of civil societies and welfare states have roots in the 1920s, 
but did not develop before the end of the Second World War. The liberal spirit 
may explain why, in the present day, wars between democracies are unlikely, but 
it contributes nothing to an historical explanation – on the contrary. The argu-
ment becomes tautological: a civil society is defined by the absence of violence, 
and if violence is not absent, it is no civil society. 
Stable modern democracies do not appear overnight, but they develop dur-
ing a long and often stormy transition period. During this process of transition, 
mass politics is often mixed up with traditional authoritarian elite policy, and 
foreign policy is only partly controlled by elected institutions. Democratising 
systems become – according to Mansfield and Snyder – more aggressive, not 
more peaceful.71 The rise of the European 19th century liberal movements was 
closely linked to new forms of popular nationalism and to the rise of the aggres-
sive national state. In the Italian Risorgimento, democratic, liberal, nationalistic, 
and expansionist ideas became parts of the same ideology. Before the rise of 
Napoleon in the German speaking countries, no common identities existed. The 
popular feeling of being part of one nation resulted directly from the French 
occupation and the wars of liberation. Anti-monarchic nationalist ideas could 
become extremely aggressive if they were able to influence foreign policy. In 
68 Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, “The Imperialism of Free Trade”, Economic 
History Review, no. 6 (1953): 1–15.
69 Owen, “How Liberalism produces Democratic Peace”: 93.
70 John Keane, Violence and Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
pp. 1 and 4.
71 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”, 
International Security, no. 20 (1995): 5.
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nearly all European states of the 19th century, liberalism and nationalism were 
two sides of the same coin, and nationalism went hand in hand with wars. 
For the 19th century Henry Kissinger has pointed out that peace was guar-
anteed in an international order, which was accepted by all important partici-
pants as legitimate. If one of the main participants questioned this order, the 
order itself became revolutionary.72 A careful analysis of the European conflict 
structure in the 19th century leads to a paradox which cannot be explained by 
the democratic peace theory. Rather often conservative monarchic or autocrat-
ic governments tried to avoid wars and to establish peace in the international 
system, whereas liberal and democratic movements, which often were strongly 
influenced by nationalist ideas, continually provoked international crisis. The 
French Revolution after 1791 promoted not only the idea of free republics but 
also of completely new forms of people’s war. The restoration of the traditional 
autocratic order after 1815 produced a long period of stable peace in Europe, 
whereas the democratising trends during and after the revolution of 1848 be-
came the cause of major international conflicts.
Since the Westphalian Peace of 1648, the principle of non-intervention in 
other state’s internal affairs became the linchpin in the development of interna-
tional law. This principle of non-intervention could only be respected within a 
stable international order without revolutionary movements. Each revolution 
threatened the fragile balance of power system, which was based on conserva-
tive and monarchical principles, and made interventions unavoidable. Demo-
cratic revolutions in the 19th century always provoked wars and did not create 
peace. This is one reason why the process of democratisation became dangerous 
by definition. Since the French Revolution, the earliest periods of the democrati-
sation process led to the bloodiest nationalist conflicts. The probability of wars 
between the democratising state and its autocratic neighbours rose enormously 
because of the growth of nationalism, which is a necessary aspect of the emer-
gence of a democratic national state.73 Mansfield and Snyder analyse the period 
between 1811 and 1980 statistically and find that democratising states were 
much more war-prone than autocratic regimes. Democratisation of states in-
creases the probability of every kind of war by between 15 per cent and 100 per 
cent, and of inter-state wars by between 35 per cent and 115 per cent compared 
with states which remained autocratic.74 The probability of civil wars further in-
creases if the process of democratisation does not result in full democratisation 
but remains in a state of irresolved instability.75
72 Quoted in: Dülffer, „Internationale Geschichte …“, p. 261.
73 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, pp. 16 and 20f; Chojnacki, „Demokratien und 
Krieg“, p. 75; Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?”, p. 39.
74 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”: 8 and 17.
75 Henderson, Democracy and War, p. 18.
During the process of democratisation, several social groups lose political 
or economic power, which is taken over by democratic institutions. If democra-
tisation takes place in an autocratic state, the old elite’s most threatened posi-
tions are often in the military sector. Social change, institutional weakness and 
threatened interests prevent the formation of stable political coalitions. Addi-
tionally, although democratisation does broaden the political spectrum, several 
groups have incompatible interests. Mansfield and Snyder mention the case of 
Great Britain before the Crimean War, where neither Whigs nor Tories could 
form lasting coalitions, because too many groups were not interested in sta-
ble political alliances.76 Before the outbreak of the ethnic conflicts in former 
Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus in the 1990s, the partial democratisation of 
society began, and in most of the cases the democratising states were the aggres-
sors, not the victims. This was true for other states, too: France, Great Britain, 
Germany, and Japan fought aggressive wars during the first period of democrati-
sation, conflicts which were aggravated by popular nationalism.77 None of those 
mechanisms which produce democratic peace in developed democracies, work 
in democratising states. 
In democratising states, a huge gap often opens up between the formal 
institutions, which are established according to democratic standards, and infor-
mal practices, which still follow completely different procedures. In some of the 
democratising states since the 1990s, formal democratic criteria were observed, 
but the existing bureaucracies showed a certain resistance against democratic 
procedures. Leaders, after their election, do not behave in accordance with those 
transparent practices which are indispensable for democratic procedures. Often 
an uncontrollably high degree of corruption prevents stabilisation. Some of the 
new democracies tend to become hybrid regimes combining authoritarian and 
democratic elements.78 
In an influential book, Jack Snyder distinguishes between four different 
ideal types of nationalism. Ethnic nationalism (Serbia) is based on common cul-
ture, language, religion, and history and these criteria are used to in- or exclude 
members in the respective national groups. Bourgeois or citizen nationalism ap-
peals for loyalty to a set of political ideas and institutions, which are regarded as 
being just and effective. Revolutionary nationalism (France in the 1790s) founds 
its appeal on a political revolution which institutes a new regime, rules in the 
name of the nation and excludes every person, who does not accept the changes. 
Counter-revolutionary nationalism (Germany before 1914) bases its appeal on 
the resistance against internal reforms and developments, which undermines the 
traditional institutions of the country. Every social class, religion, or cultural 
76 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”: 24–27.
77 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, pp. 28f.
78 Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization. Big and Bounded Generalizations”, 
Comparative Political Studies, no. 33 (2000): 713f.
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nearly all European states of the 19th century, liberalism and nationalism were 
two sides of the same coin, and nationalism went hand in hand with wars. 
For the 19th century Henry Kissinger has pointed out that peace was guar-
anteed in an international order, which was accepted by all important partici-
pants as legitimate. If one of the main participants questioned this order, the 
order itself became revolutionary.72 A careful analysis of the European conflict 
structure in the 19th century leads to a paradox which cannot be explained by 
the democratic peace theory. Rather often conservative monarchic or autocrat-
ic governments tried to avoid wars and to establish peace in the international 
system, whereas liberal and democratic movements, which often were strongly 
influenced by nationalist ideas, continually provoked international crisis. The 
French Revolution after 1791 promoted not only the idea of free republics but 
also of completely new forms of people’s war. The restoration of the traditional 
autocratic order after 1815 produced a long period of stable peace in Europe, 
whereas the democratising trends during and after the revolution of 1848 be-
came the cause of major international conflicts.
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other state’s internal affairs became the linchpin in the development of interna-
tional law. This principle of non-intervention could only be respected within a 
stable international order without revolutionary movements. Each revolution 
threatened the fragile balance of power system, which was based on conserva-
tive and monarchical principles, and made interventions unavoidable. Demo-
cratic revolutions in the 19th century always provoked wars and did not create 
peace. This is one reason why the process of democratisation became dangerous 
by definition. Since the French Revolution, the earliest periods of the democrati-
sation process led to the bloodiest nationalist conflicts. The probability of wars 
between the democratising state and its autocratic neighbours rose enormously 
because of the growth of nationalism, which is a necessary aspect of the emer-
gence of a democratic national state.73 Mansfield and Snyder analyse the period 
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creases the probability of every kind of war by between 15 per cent and 100 per 
cent, and of inter-state wars by between 35 per cent and 115 per cent compared 
with states which remained autocratic.74 The probability of civil wars further in-
creases if the process of democratisation does not result in full democratisation 
but remains in a state of irresolved instability.75
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group which formulates political ideologies against the imagined common na-
tion is excluded.79 One should add that beneath the counter-revolutionary na-
tionalism in Germany, new forms of nationalist mass mobilisation appeared, 
visible for the first time during the Second Moroccan Crisis of 1911. This mass 
mobilisation, which grew much stronger during World War I, could no longer be 
controlled by the old conservative elites, and became one of the decisive factors 
behind the rise of racist National-Socialism. 
Democratisation, if it is founded on ethnic perceptions, can become one 
of the most dangerous threats to peace. Michael Mann points out that the tran-
sition to democracy is extremely dangerous and often results in ethnic wars 
or ethnic cleansing. The integrative power of the old state ceases, or it falls 
apart while a new state is still developing.80 During the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union, democratising Serbia and Croatia as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan 
went to war against each other.81 According to Snyder, more ethnic democracy 
will not contribute to more peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.82 The case 
of Rwanda shows in the most horrific way how democratisation, the resistance 
of old elites and ethnic perceptions exploded in an outbreak of genocidal mass 
violence. Within only four months nearly one million people were killed, be-
cause some members of the old, partly military elites used the ethnic argument 
against the slow process of democratisation and started the genocide to restore 
their power position.83
Since Kant, many of the democratic peace theorists believe that public 
opinion in democracies is always peaceful. The democratic citizenship shares 
powerful norms which discourage the deployment of deadly force. However, 
this institutional theory has several weak points, too. The theory works well in 
debates about political or economic values, but its explanatory power is limited 
once nationalism or ethnicity appears as a force to be reckoned with. If demo-
cratic public opinion had this normative effect, democracies would always be 
peaceful and not only in their relations with other democracies. Lost lives and 
lost money are always the same, irrespective of whether a war is conducted 
against another democracy or an autocracy. Many historical examples show 
a striking contrast between a warlike mood in public opinion and a peaceful 
democratic government. In 1898, the McKinley administration wanted to avoid 
a conflict but was driven into the war with Spain by American public opinion 
79 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, pp. 38 and 68f.
80 Michael Mann, Die Dunkle Seite der Demokratie. Eine Theorie der ethnischen 
Säuberungen [The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing] (Hamburg: 
HIS Verlag, 2007), p. 41.
81 Mansfield and Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”: 6.
82 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, pp. 352f.
83 Boris Barth, Genozid. Völkermord im 20. Jahrhundert. Geschichte, Theorien, 
Kontroversen [Genocide in the 20th Century. History, Theory, and Controversies] 
(München: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2006), pp 112–127.
and by the relevant New York newspapers.84 The patriotic mob, not only in 
autocratic Berlin, but also in democratic London and Paris, openly demanded 
war in August 1914.85 
To understand the conflict behaviour of democracies, it is necessary to have 
a look at their “dark side”, too. If, in democratising states or in early modern 
democratic settler colonies, nationalism converged with perceptions of race and 
democracy, very dangerous situations could arise for other ethnic groups or 
minorities. The American historian Michael Mann formulates the thesis that 
democratic ethnic cleansing is an integral part of our modernity. Cleansing very 
seldom happens in stable modern contemporary democracies, but many liberal 
democracies are deeply rooted in brutal ethnic cleansing.86 Rummel’s argument 
that people are always peace-loving once they can vote freely is unsupported by 
historical evidence. Since the 17th century, European settlers behaved much more 
murderously under constitutional than under authoritarian regimes. Of course, 
Mann does not plea for the abolition of democracy, but in many cases authori-
tarian regimes were able to put down ethnic tensions by oppressive means, while 
democratisation promoted the dramatic rise of ethnic violence.87 
Defining a democratic nation means at the same time distinguishing be-
tween those people who have the right to become a citizen and participate in 
the democratic decision making processes and those who do not belong to the 
people. All white settler communities had to find criteria for inclusion and ex-
clusion. Normally, the indigenous population was excluded at the outset, and 
the process of self-definition often went hand in hand with the development of 
racist ideas. For the generations which founded the USA it appeared self-evident 
that the country should be a white Protestant society and furious debates took 
place about whether a further Catholic immigration was acceptable. Against 
this background it is not surprising that ethnic or racist ideas normally became 
an integral part of European settler democracies from the very beginning.
AlTERNATIVE ExPlANATIONS FOR DEmOCRATIC PEACE
Even if developed democracies do not go to war with one another, factors of 
realpolitik are more important for war and peace than the respective form of 
state, as some critics of democratic peace argue.88 Some historians and politi-
cal scientists believe that the democratic peace theory does not really describe 
the problem. Scott Gates doubts whether it is possible to create a simple causal 
correlation between democracy and peace.89 Completely different factors are 
84 Layne, “Kant or Cant”: 12.
85 Gates et. al., “Democracy and Peace”: 2.
86 Mann, Dunkle Seite der Demokratie, pp. 7 and 11–14.
87 Ibid., p. 40.
88 Zeev Maoz, “The Controversy over the Democratic Peace. Rearguard action or cracks 
in the wall”, International Security, no. 22 (1997): 164.
89 Gates et. al., “Democracy and Peace”: 1.
OF_1_2008_Innhold.indd   26 06-02-08   11:04:10
OSlO FIlES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy 21/2008 The DemOcraTIc peace cONTrOverSy
group which formulates political ideologies against the imagined common na-
tion is excluded.79 One should add that beneath the counter-revolutionary na-
tionalism in Germany, new forms of nationalist mass mobilisation appeared, 
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of old elites and ethnic perceptions exploded in an outbreak of genocidal mass 
violence. Within only four months nearly one million people were killed, be-
cause some members of the old, partly military elites used the ethnic argument 
against the slow process of democratisation and started the genocide to restore 
their power position.83
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opinion in democracies is always peaceful. The democratic citizenship shares 
powerful norms which discourage the deployment of deadly force. However, 
this institutional theory has several weak points, too. The theory works well in 
debates about political or economic values, but its explanatory power is limited 
once nationalism or ethnicity appears as a force to be reckoned with. If demo-
cratic public opinion had this normative effect, democracies would always be 
peaceful and not only in their relations with other democracies. Lost lives and 
lost money are always the same, irrespective of whether a war is conducted 
against another democracy or an autocracy. Many historical examples show 
a striking contrast between a warlike mood in public opinion and a peaceful 
democratic government. In 1898, the McKinley administration wanted to avoid 
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minorities. The American historian Michael Mann formulates the thesis that 
democratic ethnic cleansing is an integral part of our modernity. Cleansing very 
seldom happens in stable modern contemporary democracies, but many liberal 
democracies are deeply rooted in brutal ethnic cleansing.86 Rummel’s argument 
that people are always peace-loving once they can vote freely is unsupported by 
historical evidence. Since the 17th century, European settlers behaved much more 
murderously under constitutional than under authoritarian regimes. Of course, 
Mann does not plea for the abolition of democracy, but in many cases authori-
tarian regimes were able to put down ethnic tensions by oppressive means, while 
democratisation promoted the dramatic rise of ethnic violence.87 
Defining a democratic nation means at the same time distinguishing be-
tween those people who have the right to become a citizen and participate in 
the democratic decision making processes and those who do not belong to the 
people. All white settler communities had to find criteria for inclusion and ex-
clusion. Normally, the indigenous population was excluded at the outset, and 
the process of self-definition often went hand in hand with the development of 
racist ideas. For the generations which founded the USA it appeared self-evident 
that the country should be a white Protestant society and furious debates took 
place about whether a further Catholic immigration was acceptable. Against 
this background it is not surprising that ethnic or racist ideas normally became 
an integral part of European settler democracies from the very beginning.
AlTERNATIVE ExPlANATIONS FOR DEmOCRATIC PEACE
Even if developed democracies do not go to war with one another, factors of 
realpolitik are more important for war and peace than the respective form of 
state, as some critics of democratic peace argue.88 Some historians and politi-
cal scientists believe that the democratic peace theory does not really describe 
the problem. Scott Gates doubts whether it is possible to create a simple causal 
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responsible for the fact that wars became rarer in some regions of the world 
than in others. It is not one factor, as Gleditsch believes, or even a possible third 
variable, which is responsible for war and peace, but perhaps 15 or 20 differ-
ent variables, which differ according to time and place. The main problem is 
that the statistical analysis of such a great number of possible variables limits 
the use of quantitative methodology. Other internal and external factors which 
play a role in war and peace, are the level of development and the state of the 
economy, geographical distance, territorial border disputes, ethnic and nation-
alist self-definitions, racism, the creation and development of alliance systems 
and the respective perceptions of other states. Additionally, one has to take into 
account the disparities of wealth in a society, the social structures, collective 
mentalities, cultural differences, public and published opinion, the recruitment 
of elites, the degree of a government’s authority over foreign policy, the role of 
interest groups, the existence and the strengths of a military-industrial complex, 
different levels of weapons technology, military traditions and the degree of a 
society’s militarization, factors which can be completely independent from the 
form of state. It is easy to find examples in history in which each of these vari-
ables played a decisive role in the decision-making processes which led to the 
escalation of conflicts. 
Some authors argue that it is not enough to analyse possible wars between 
democracies: peace research must rather ask whether and why democracies go 
to war at all. Raymond Cohen, Chan and others criticise the fact that the demo-
cratic peace literature is limited to international wars, while colonial, imperial-
ist, or civil wars are ignored. Colonial wars were often not conducted against 
states in the European sense of the word but against political units with clear 
hierarchical power structures.90 Some historians argue that completely different 
factors are responsible for the fact that in some regions of the world, more wars 
broke out than in others. Dynamic developments in the international system 
are defined away in DP literature: The transition from peace to war sometimes 
cannot be easily defined and there are stable and unstable situations of peace as 
well. Even a stable peace system can change rapidly, or it can block processes of 
necessary reforms, as in the European state system after 1815.91 Hitherto, the 
democratic peace theory has completely neglected the motives that caused states 
to go to war.
Paradoxically, the American political theory of the democratic peace very 
often applies a Eurocentric perspective. The American Indian wars or the great 
British war in South Africa against the Zulus who had a high degree of state 
organisation, are not accepted as international wars. This perspective goes hand 
90 Cohen, “Pacific Unions”: 207–224; Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall”: 619 and 
625.
91 Dülffer, „Internationale Geschichte …“, p. 252.
in hand with Neo-Rankean interpretations of history, which most historians 
have given up as outdated for several decades, since the great historiographical 
debates of the 1960s and 70s. According to the Neo-Rankean world view, it is 
not human beings, governments, social groups or political parties that are the 
subject of history, but states as such. This premise has very far-reaching meth-
odological consequences, because a great part of the democratic peace theory 
operates with concepts of state and war that were valid only in the late 19th 
century.
Even Maoz, who strongly defends the democratic peace theory, admits that 
democratic states have intervened secretly in other democracies like the USA 
did in Chile 1973. However, for him, this is the exception from the rule, and he 
believes that democracies involve themselves more seldom in covert operations 
than do authoritarian states.92 One may be doubtful of this this claim: secret 
interventions do not depend on the formal structure of a single state, but more 
on the structure and the forms of international conflicts. Kegley and Hermann 
criticise the fact that all studies concerning the democratic peace concentrate 
solely on major wars while neglecting small wars and military interventions. 
They find 15 cases of military intervention between 1974 and 1988 in which free 
democratic states intervened in other democratic states’ internal affairs with mil-
itary means. 32 interventions took place against “partly free” states, and these 
interventions were comparable to the gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century.93 
However, gunboats are no longer necessary because modern great powers have 
different means of intervention. The ironical aspect of the Chilean intervention 
results from the fact that Chile was no autocracy and the decentralised and 
independent state institutions could be turned against the elected president.94 
The USA conducted several secret wars against other elected governments, too. 
Within a zone of democratic peace, a zone of dangers can exist, because democ-
racies do not necessarily respect the doctrine of non-intervention in other states’ 
internal affairs.95 
Layne examines four big crises in which democracies nearly went to war 
with one another. He finds that the form of government had no significance for 
de-escalation. If the democratic peace theory were correct, then crises between 
democracies with serious threats of war should be impossible, too. He analyses 
the Trent Affair of 1861 between Great Britain and the USA, the Venezuelan 
crisis of 1895/96, France and Great Britain during the Fashoda Crisis of 1898 
and France and Germany during the Ruhr Crisis of 1923. In all these conflicts, 
war was avoided because of reasons which had nothing to do with democratic 
92 Maoz, “The Controversy over the Democratic Peace”: 177ff.
93 Kegley and Hermann, “Putting military intervention into the democratic peace”: 80f.
94 Cohen, “Pacific Unions”: 218.
95 Kegley and Hermann, “Military interventions and the Democratic Peace”: 5.
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form of state. It is easy to find examples in history in which each of these vari-
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cratic peace literature is limited to international wars, while colonial, imperial-
ist, or civil wars are ignored. Colonial wars were often not conducted against 
states in the European sense of the word but against political units with clear 
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factors are responsible for the fact that in some regions of the world, more wars 
broke out than in others. Dynamic developments in the international system 
are defined away in DP literature: The transition from peace to war sometimes 
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well. Even a stable peace system can change rapidly, or it can block processes of 
necessary reforms, as in the European state system after 1815.91 Hitherto, the 
democratic peace theory has completely neglected the motives that caused states 
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interventions were comparable to the gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century.93 
However, gunboats are no longer necessary because modern great powers have 
different means of intervention. The ironical aspect of the Chilean intervention 
results from the fact that Chile was no autocracy and the decentralised and 
independent state institutions could be turned against the elected president.94 
The USA conducted several secret wars against other elected governments, too. 
Within a zone of democratic peace, a zone of dangers can exist, because democ-
racies do not necessarily respect the doctrine of non-intervention in other states’ 
internal affairs.95 
Layne examines four big crises in which democracies nearly went to war 
with one another. He finds that the form of government had no significance for 
de-escalation. If the democratic peace theory were correct, then crises between 
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crisis of 1895/96, France and Great Britain during the Fashoda Crisis of 1898 
and France and Germany during the Ruhr Crisis of 1923. In all these conflicts, 
war was avoided because of reasons which had nothing to do with democratic 
92 Maoz, “The Controversy over the Democratic Peace”: 177ff.
93 Kegley and Hermann, “Putting military intervention into the democratic peace”: 80f.
94 Cohen, “Pacific Unions”: 218.
95 Kegley and Hermann, “Military interventions and the Democratic Peace”: 5.
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peace.96 The Ruhr Crisis in particular shows that democratic peace does not 
work. A war was avoided simply because Germany was not able to conduct one, 
but French foreign policy did not in any way differentiate between an autocratic 
and a democratic Germany, neither did French public opinion or French elites. 
All four crises did not escalate into major wars because a minimum of realism 
prevailed. The causal logic of democratic peace has no explanatory power.97 
Dülffer et al. have arrived at a rather similar conclusion after the analysis of 33 
cases, where wars were avoided. They can find no connection between internal 
forms of states and external behaviour in crises occurring between 1856 and 
1914. Much more important for the successful resolution of international con-
flicts were cultural factors, strategic reasons and perceptions of future develop-
ments.98 
More promising is the research into regional zones of peace. Another im-
portant historical aspect of long lasting periods of peace is often completely 
neglected by the democratic peace theory: the problem of empires. The estab-
lishment of an empire goes hand in hand with wars, conquest, and the fight 
against uprisings. However, after an empire is established, it normally creates 
a stable zone of peace, albeit at the price of a certain level of internal suppres-
sion. Shortly before the end of the 19th century, Cecil Rhodes put the topic on 
the table in the most cynical, but correct way: if the Anglo-Saxon race – includ-
ing the USA – were to be united under British leadership and found a colonial 
empire from the Cape to Cairo, the greatest advantage of British world power 
would be to put an end to all wars.99 One does not have to agree with Rhodes 
here, but empire and internal peace, or peace zones are nearly identical. The Pax 
Romana, i.e. Roman rule in the Mediterranean created a long period of peace 
for many peoples in classical antiquity. The concept of a Pax Britannica in the 
19th century was partly propaganda, but between 1818, the end of the conquest 
of India and 1857, the year of the Sepoy uprising, no military conflicts occurred 
within the empire. Those peoples who were prepared to accept that their fu-
ture lay under British rule, could benefit from the economic welfare and peace 
it promoted. All great early-modern multinational and multi-religious empires 
were regional zones of peace. In spite of autocratic rule and local repression, 
economic welfare, limited opportunities for social improvement and security for 
the individual were guaranteed, as long as he was willing to abjure separatist 
ideas. This was not only true for the British Empire, but also for Russia since 
96 Layne, “Kant or Cant”: 6f and 14f.
97 Ibid.: 36ff.
98 Dülffer, „Internationale Geschichte …“, p. 259.
99 Quoted in: Wolfgang J. Mommsen, ed., Imperialismus. Seine geistigen, politischen und 
wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen. Ein Quellen- und Arbeitsbuch [Imperialism. Its Cultural, 
Political and Economic Foundations] (Hamburg, Hoffmann Campe, 1977), pp 48f.
Peter I., for Austria-Hungary and even for the Ottoman Empire, whose integra-
tive power is often still underestimated. 
There are other regional peace zones which cannot be explained by the 
democratic peace theory. Cohen believes that the biggest threat to the demo-
cratic peace theory comes from South America. During the last hundred years, 
the region was much more stable than Europe and most of the time all states 
avoided wars irrespective of the various regime types. North America was also a 
regional peace zone during the 20th century, but this fact should not be explained 
by Kant, but by the enormous power of the USA. The regional peace zone in 
Oceania seems to have nothing to do with democratic perceptions, either. A war 
between Papua New Guinea and Australia is more than unlikely; Australia and 
New Zealand are far away from each other and there is simply no reason for 
conflicts.100 
Since the end of the Second World War, the formation of multinational or-
ganisations has promoted the establishment of regional zones of peace. Perhaps 
the most successful project of a permanent peace developed slowly among the 
Western European states after 1945. No general empirical law is necessary to 
understand this fact. The horrific consequences of two world wars and of ex-
tremist genocidal dictatorships have convinced the broad majority of the popu-
lations and elites of the need to create international structures for the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts. The economic integration of Western Europe produced 
growing welfare – no one has anything to gain anymore by giving up peace. 
When the process of European unification started in the early 1950s, one aim 
was to promote the process of democratisation in the former fascist states of 
Germany and Italy. Another aim was to construct a peaceful Western Europe by 
controlling the respective German armament potential. If coal and steel, later 
the use of nuclear energy (Euratom) was administered by a common interna-
tional bureaucracy, a secret armament programme became simply impossible.
The concepts of the OECD peace or the OECD world are often used in 
contemporary literature to mark these specific zones of peace and prosperity, 
which developed slowly after the end of the Second World War.101 An OECD 
peace or a regional peace develops if several states perceive each other as peace-
ful. However, according to Dülffer it is impossible to find general laws for the 
conditions, which are necessary for the development of such perceptions.102
Another striking problem for peace research results from various facts 
which cannot be explained by the democratic peace theory, although the theory 
can contribute to the understanding of actual conflict behaviour. Since the end 
of the Second World War and again after the breakdown of the Soviet empire, 
100 Cohen, “Pacific Unions“: 215.
101 Senghaas, Zum irdischen Frieden, pp. 163ff. 
102 Dülffer, „Internationale Geschichte …“, p. 262.
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only very few bilateral international wars have broken out, but the level of inter-
national violence has not declined despite the spread of democratisation world-
wide. The typical conflict is the asymmetric war. This is not an argument against 
democratic peace, but it shows certain limits of the theory. If one of the parties 
in a conflict is an anti-colonial freedom movement or a group of guerrillas, no 
matter what their political aims are, a democratic government is by definition 
impossible. The DP theory has no explanatory power if one tries to analyse the 
question of warlike or peaceful decolonisation after 1945. How could partisans 
or guerrillas in Asia or Africa, fighting a war in the shadows, organise elections 
to a parliament or organise responsible government? Necessarily one party in an 
asymmetric conflict cannot be a democracy and must be organised in a strictly 
hierarchical manner. Additionally, the democratic peace theory does not take 
weapons technology into account. A major war between or against a nuclear 
power is impossible, whether democratic or not, if the aggressor wants to avoid 
suicide. 
A completely different model to explain peace in the Western world was 
developed by Dieter Senghaas. Not democracy, which is difficult to define, but 
six different factors are responsible for the development of civil societies in the 
Western world, which perhaps can become more peaceful than other types of 
governments in the future. All six factors are mutually dependent in a highly 
dynamic way and if only one is weakened, a modern civil society will destabilise 
at once. The factors are: 
the legitimate monopoly of state power, 
the independent control of this state power under the rule of law, 
individual and collective control of emotions and affects, 
the democratic participation in the decision making processes in a society, 
and 
continuous attempts to improve social justice 
a political culture promoting the constructive resolution of conflicts.103 
Such civil societies did not develop before the end of the Second World War, but 
the model explains much better the internal and external conflict behaviour of 
states than the democratic peace theory.
To sum up: towards the end of this paper, a final paradox should be men-
tioned. It is true that established and stable contemporary democracies do not 
wage war on one another. This has, however, nothing to do with the complicated 
democratic peace theory in its statistical version. The problem of the democratic 
peace theory is not that it states something completely wrong, but that its hori-
zon is too narrow to integrate the many other factors which are also responsible 
103 Senghaas, Zum irdischen Frieden, pp. 31–41.
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6.
for war and peace. The basic question remains: how, why and when democra-
cies could have gone to war with one another? If one uses a strict definition of 
democracy, the number of democratic states in the 19th century was extremely 
small and consequently the probability of wars between them as well was very 
low. In a global historical perspective democracies were a very rare exception. 
Despite this fact, during the 19th century, wars between democracies were avoid-
ed only with great difficulty and often at the last moment. Spiro, too, is certain 
that the absence of war between democracies in the 19th century is statistically 
insignificant.104
In the 20th century, the situation was similar. The short wave of democra-
tisation after the end of the First World War and after the breakdown of several 
European multi-ethnic empires ebbed within a very few years. By the middle of 
the 1930s, Czechoslovakia was the only remaining democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe and in the Spanish civil war, fascism reached Western Europe, 
too. The process of democratisation in Western Europe after 1945 took place 
in the shadow of the Cold War. Most democracies existed within the American 
zone of influence or – as minor allies – within the informal or formal American 
empire. At the same time, for a vast variety of reasons, the incidence of “classi-
cal” bilateral war between states or between great power alliances was drasti-
cally reduced, while that of other forms of asymmetric wars, military interven-
tions or civil wars rose rapidly. 
It makes little sense to explain war and peace during the Cold War by us-
ing the democratic peace theory alone. Bipolarity was responsible for peace in 
Europe and elsewhere. Every relevant state in the world was either allied with 
one of the superpowers and could not go to war alone, or it was neutralised 
by negotiations between the two blocs. As Schwartz and Skinner point out, 
two more factors explain the world’s situation after 1945 much better than the 
democratic peace theory. Firstly, after the extreme destruction of World War II, 
no evident casus belli existed. The potential revanchist powers, Germany and 
Japan, were occupied by allied troops and only half-sovereign. The remaining 
Western colonial powers were so preoccupied with holding on to their colonies 
that they could not look for more. Secondly, most democratic states were united 
in NATO and had organised their armed forces in a common security organisa-
tion. The neutral democracies (Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and Austria) were 
standing between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, whereas others (Costa Rica, 
India, Australia, New Zealand) were geographically far away from each other 
and for the remaining democracies (Ireland, San Marino), war was impossible. 
104 David E. Spiro, “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace”, International Security, no. 
19 (1994): 68.
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The confrontation between Greece and Turkey shows that war was very difficult 
within the security organisation of NATO.105 
It is only since the early 1990s that the number of democracies has reached 
a significant and remarkable level worldwide. However, any classical definition 
of war, as it is still used in the COW project and by other comparable research 
projects, uses an unrealistic scenario for the time after 1945, or 1990 respective-
ly. Any prognosis as to whether there will be wars between democracies or not 
is still beyond the ken of scholars and beyond serious analysis, although a gen-
eral tendency – democracies behave more peacefully towards one another – is 
predictable. Certainly there will be more military interventions and asymmetric 
wars of many kinds, and there is no reason to believe that democracies will not 
take part in them. Despite a clear tendency towards the democratic peace, every 
threat to liberalism and civil society also means a threat to international peace. 
Democratic peace is no natural law, as some authors believe, and is not identical 
with Kant’s idea of perpetual peace.106
One last question remains open. Because of its background in political 
science, the democratic peace debate was only interested in the 19th and 20th 
century – with one exception. Spencer Weart’s analysis of the early modern re-
publics should stimulate further historical research. Is it really true that these 
towns and developing small states automatically behaved more peacefully to-
wards each other if they were ruled by republican elites? Is the republican form 
of state responsible for peace or are there other still unknown variables? Is it 
possible to bring together the idea of an early modern republican peace with the 
well known fact that “war made states and states made war” (Charles Tilly)? A 
new and fascinating field is still open for further historical research. 
105 Schwartz and Skinner, “The Myth of the Democratic Peace”: 165f.
106 Owen, “How Liberalism produces Democratic Peace”: 90 and 125; with a similar 
tendency: Ray, “Does Democracy Cause Peace?”, p. 38.
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